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Abstract 
In this thesis we start by providing some detail regarding how we arrived at our 
present understanding of probabilities and how we manipulate them – the product and 
addition rules by Cox. We also discuss the modern view of entropy and how it relates to 
known entropies such as the thermodynamic entropy and the information entropy. Next, 
we show that Skilling's method of induction leads us to a unique general theory of 
inductive inference, the ME method and  precisely how it is that other entropies such as 
those of Renyi or Tsallis are ruled out for problems of inference. We then explore the 
compatibility of Bayes and ME updating. After pointing out the distinction between 
Bayes' theorem and the Bayes' updating rule, we show that Bayes' rule is a special case of 
ME updating by translating information in the form of data into constraints that can be 
processed using ME. This implies that ME is capable of reproducing every aspect of 
orthodox Bayesian inference and proves the complete compatibility of Bayesian and 
entropy methods. We illustrated this by showing that ME can be used to derive two 
results traditionally in the domain of Bayesian statistics, Laplace's Succession rule and 
Jeffrey's conditioning rule. 
The realization that the ME method incorporates Bayes' rule as a special case allows 
us to go beyond Bayes' rule and to process both data and expected value constraints 
simultaneously. We discuss the general problem of non-commuting constraints, when 
they should be processed sequentially and when simultaneously. The generic "canonical" 
form of the posterior distribution for the problem of simultaneous updating with data and 
moments is obtained. This a major achievement since it shows that ME is not only 
capable of processing information in the form of constraints, like MaxEnt and 
 ii
information in the form of data, as in Bayes' Theorem, but also can process both forms 
simultaneously, which Bayes and MaxEnt cannot do alone.  
We illustrate some potential applications for this new method by applying ME to 
potential problems of interest. 
 iii
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Preface
It is well established and agreed upon why we use probabilities; we use probabilities
because we lack complete information. However, how they are used has been a
contentious problem. How we use probabilities depends on ones denition of the
word.
Every practically useful question that we can ask is one in which we lack informa-
tion. Questions we may ask are, Is there life on Mars?, Is the price of gold going to
drop tomorrow?and What is the cure for cancer?Of course the questions can be
much more mundane, such as, How long is my pen?or Should I cross the street?
The feature that all of these questions share is that in each we lack information to
some degree. We can only do one thing when faced with a lack of information: reason
by induction.
In all cases, the object is to process information that we have regarding a certain
question in a systematic and consistent way, in order to provide the best answer to the
question. The Maximum relative Entropy (ME) method that we detail in part two of
this thesis turns out to be the universal method for processing information. We will
prove this using general examples with information in the forms of constraints and
data. However, it important to point out in the beginning that while the examples
viii
may be generic the method is universally applicable.
ix
Part 1: A brief history of
probability and entropy
We will attempt to give an extremely brief overview of the main lines of logic and
highlight what we feel are the key ideas that have brought us to our current under-
standing of probabilities and how to process information. We will supply references
to which the reader may further research the foundations that have lead to the work
presented here.
1
Chapter 1
Probability
The concept of probability is as old as time itself. For humans, it is almost impossible
to communicate without using the words, probably, likely, etc. The reason is
obvious; we simply lack enough information to answer most questions. But why ask
questions in the rst place? Because we wish to learn. Question and answers are
the foundations of learning. Therefore, probabilistic notions are necessary to learn.
The process of learning is the process of inference. We learn by processing partial
information which yields answers with uncertainty probabilities. Additionally, when
we get new information, we add it to what we already know, reprocess and arrive at
new probabilities.
However, probabilities by themselves are practically useless. It is when we compare
probabilities that they become useful. For example: suppose that there are three
paths and one must make a decision on which path to follow. Suppose that one gains
su¢ cient information regarding a particular path where the probability of survival
along the path is 30%. Should one take that path? It depends upon the probabilities
of other paths. If one of the alternatives has a higher probability of survival then
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the answer is no. One may assign equal probabilities to the other paths if no other
information is present, but this is still so that we can compare them. In this chapter
we will attempt to briey describe how we have come to our present understanding
of probabilities.
1.1 James (Jacob) Bernoulli (16541705)
Although probabilities had been examined prior to Bernoulli, he was the rst one to
use a common language to describe them mathematics. Bernoulli gave his greatest
work (which was published 8 years after his death) the name, Ars Conjectandi (The
Art of Conjecturing) [1]. Literally the art of guessing. However, his guesses were
meant to be consistent and more importantly his process of guessing was meant to be
consistent. In other words, there are both wise ways of guessing and foolish ways of
guessing. This is the single most important key to learning. It will be the overriding
theme throughout this thesis: if a process of guessing or inference is inconsistent,
then it is foolish.
One of the rst ideas that he proposed was that if one did not know anything about
various possible outcomes, then one should assign each outcome the same probability.
This was called the principle of insu¢ cient reason(PIR).1 For example, if two dice
that we know nothing about are thrown, the probability of getting any combination
of numbers is equally likely. In this case, there are 6 ways out of 36 possibilities to
get a seven.2 To make this more general, we look at the hypothesis space, H; which
consists of our potential propositions, A; so that H = H(A1 : : : Ak): This is sometimes
1Contrary to a great number of authors, PIR was coined by Johannes von Kries [4].
2PIR was in its infancy at this stage and only used by Bernoulli in cases of symmetry, like dice.
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called the eld of discourse. We will label the number of cases where A is favorable,
M; and label the total number of cases, N; so that
p(A)  M
N
; (1.1)
where p(A) is the probability of getting A; or of A being true. For our example, the
probability of getting a sevenwith two dice is 1=6.
This result seems very reasonable. However, one may not see the problem with
(1.1) immediately. The problem is that one would have to know all of the cases,
N to assign a probability. He realized that (1.1) was not the solution for practical
matters, only for games of chance. To quote the man himself, ...what mortal will
ever determine, for example, the number of diseases...? It would clearly be mad to
want to learn anything this way.
For a more pragmatic solution, it seems reasonable that we could extend (1.1)
by interpreting the number of favorable observed outcomes (trials) as favorable cases
and total outcomes as total cases thus
(A)  m
n
; (1.2)
which is the frequency of observed favorable occurrences where m is the number
of observed favorable outcomes and n is the total observed outcomes. Yet there is
another problem. The new problem is that this is simply a ratio of observed cases
and not necessarily what one should expect to observe as outcomes from a di¤erent
number of trials. In other words, in 36 rolls should we expect to get 6 sevens? If
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1000 people rolled perfectly symmetric dice, would they all get exactly 1=6 of their
roles to come up seven? To put this in more technical terms, if we considered (1.2)
a probabilityshould we expect observe it in any population? It was well understood
by his time that as one observed more outcomes, one decreased the danger there
will be of error[2]. Therefore, Bernoulli sought to determine a relationship between
(1.1) and (1.2) which he showed by penning his famous formula,
P (mjp; n) =

n
m

pm (1  p)n m ; (1.3)
where P (mjp; n) is the probability of getting m favorable observed outcomes, given
the ratio p, and the number of total outcomes, n. This is known as the Binomial
Distribution. Where 1  p represents all non-favorable outcomes. In our example, all
number combinations that are not seven.
We can see the relationship between p (1.1) and  (1.2) directly by the following:
Consider the expected value of the number of success, hmi where our probability
function is P (mjp; q; n) =  n
m

mpmqn m,
hmip;q =
nX
m=0
mP (mjp; q; n) =
nX
m=0

n
m

mpmqn m : (1.4)
We substitute
mpm = p
@pm
@p
; (1.5)
so that
hmip;q = p
@
@p
nX
m=0

n
m

pmqn m : (1.6)
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Next we note the binomial theorem without proof,
nX
m=0

n
m

pmqn m = (p+ q)n : (1.7)
Substituting this into our expectation (1.4),
hmip;q = p
@
@p
(p+ q)n = pn(p+ q)n 1 : (1.8)
Specically we wish to know hmi when q = 1   p. With this substitution, our nal
result is,
hmip;1 p = pn or
hmi
n
= hi = p ; (1.9)
which shows that it is the expected value of the frequency that is equivalent to the
probability. Thus, in general, the probability is not equivalent to the frequency.
However, by a similar set of calculations, one can show that the expected value of the
variance is 

(   p)2 = p(1  p)
n
: (1.10)
As n tends to innity, the variance tends to zero. Therefore, as Bernoulli proposed,
the frequency equals the probability in the limit,
lim
n!1
() = p ; (1.11)
which he called his Golden Theorem. In 1835, his student, Siméon-Denis Poisson
(17811840), rewrote his theorem and called it La loi des grands nombres(The law
of large numbers) [3]. It should be noted that many people after him worked on this
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including Chebyshev, Markov, Borel, Cantelli and Kolmogorov, all of whom helped
to transform the law into two forms: the weak law and the strong law.
Having shown that probability is not equivalent to frequency, except as the number
of trials tends to innity, we get to Bernoullis big problem: How does one determine
the probability without being able to observe an innite amount of trials?His def-
inition of probability (1.1) was not practical and the frequency (1.2) could never be
the true probability. Therefore, he concluded that for practical problems, one could
only use the frequency as an estimate of the true probability. This estimatewould
used for another 150 years by the majority of mathematicians and statisticians. Yet
it was still to be resolved what to do when one had a few samples, if any at all.
1.2 Thomas Bayes (17021761)
In one sense, the Reverend Thomas Bayescontribution would have been too small to
have his own section in this work. On the other hand, it would be strange not to have
a section dedicated to the man whose name is given to one of the most fundamental
and inuential theorems of all time.
Besides being a British clergyman, Bayes was also an amateur mathematician.
Amongst his writings was something he called, inverse probability[5]. Essentially
this was an attempt to solve the problem that Bernoulli did not; how to determine
the probability of something given its frequency. In other words, given m and n;
what was p? Or to state it formally using Bernoullis notation, he found that the
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probability that (1.1) lies in the interval p < p(A) < p+ dp is
P (dpjm;n) = (n+ 1)!
m! (n m)!p
m (1  p)n m dp : (1.12)
Today this is called the Beta distribution. Unfortunately, Bayes notes were obscure
and muddled. As a result, it is not clear what his motivations or intentions were
with the above solution. Aside from (1.12), Bayes did little more to contribute to the
statistical methodology that bears his name.
1.3 Pierre-Simon Laplace (17491827)
It is remarkable that a science which began with the consideration of games of chance
should have become the most important object of human knowledge.Laplace
In almost his rst published work, Laplace rediscovered Bayes solution to the
inverse problemand restated it with far greater clarity than Bayes. Laplace gener-
alized the inverse problem in the following way: Suppose one observes a set of events,
X = fx1 : : : xng. Let the set of possible causes of said events be,  = f1 : : : Ng.
Let us also assume that we know the probability of observing the set of events given
a particular cause, P (Xji).3 Finally, we initially consider all of the causes equally
likely.4 Laplace then proposed that the probability for getting a particular cause,
3This is called a conditional probability, as the probability of X being true is conditional or
dependent on i being true. It also should be noted that this is a modern notation.
4Equally likely means that we consider the prior probabilities to be uniform.
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given a set of events, could be written as,
P (ijX) = P (Xji)PN
j=1 P (Xjj)
: (1.13)
Later, Laplace then generalized this further by suggesting that the probability P (Xji);
could be weighted by other information, such as prior information about the cause.
He would write this as P (ijI); where I is some initial information, such as a die
having n tosses. Adding this weight we get what is called BayesTheorem,
P (ijX; I) = P (ijI)P (XjI; i)PN
j=1 P (jjI)P (XjI; j)
=
P (ijI)P (XjI; i)
P (XjI) ; (1.14)
where P (XjI) is often referred to as the evidence.
Laplace was not without his own problems as well. The rst and most obvious
problem is what P (ijI) is and how do we acquire it? Laplace suggested that if
we are ignorant of the prior information regarding i and therefore do not know the
prior probability, P (ijI); we should assume P (ijI) is uniform, i.e., P (ijI) = 1=N .
In other words, use the principle of insu¢ cient reason, just as Bernoulli suggested.
Unfortunately, this puts us right back where we started from; why should we assume
this is true? Laplace restates the principle thusly, The theory of chance consists in
reducing all the events of the same kind to a certain number of cases equally possi-
ble, that is to say, to such as we may be equally undecided about in regard to their
existence, and in determining the number of cases favorable to the event whose prob-
ability is sought[6]. This produced even more criticism. When should we use PIR?
When there is a symmetry, as in so called fair dice, as Bernoulli suggests? Or when
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we are undecided? Meaning when we are ignorant? Laplace o¤ers no explanation
or suggestion. To make matters worse, he simply states (1.14) to be correct with-
out rigorously showing the path of his logic [7]. Thus, despite his enormous success
in elds such as astronomy, meteorology, geodesy, population statistics, etc., he was
only pragmatically successful using (1.13) and not (1.14). Thus, Bayes Theorem went
unused and heavily criticized.
We conclude with Laplace by discussing one of the most fundamentally brilliant
suggestions that he makes in his writings. At this time (and long after) probabilities
were thought of as a property of the object. For example: A particular roulette
ball would have a certain probability of settling into the 17 black slot. This is true
for every observer if the roulette wheel remains untouched. However, another ball
on another roulette wheel would have its own probability of landing in 17 black,
so the common logic went. Laplace suggested that it is not the fact that the ball is
di¤erent but that the knowledge or information about the ball is di¤erent. Thus if the
information regarding the balls were the same, then both balls would have the same
probabilities. Furthermore, he was criticized because his use of wein his statement
above regarding his theory of chance. It suggests that di¤erent people could have
di¤erent probabilities for the same object. This is precisely what he means! Again,
the probability is a product of the information regarding the object, not an artifact of
the object itself. Thus two people who have di¤erent pieces or amounts of information
could indeed assign di¤erent probabilities to the same object. This is another key
point in this thesis. To enhance Laplaces idea we turn it around and state it thusly:
Two rational agents, who use the same process to assign probabilities to the same
event, and have the same information regarding the event, must assign the same
10
probabilities to the same event. This is a result of consistency.
1.4 Richard Threlkeld Cox (18981991)
In 1946, Cox wrote a small yet monumental paper that nally gave Laplaces ideas
esh [8]. In it, he gave examples of common inference problems that sampling theory
could not handle. Yet, he noted, the goal of both the frequentists and the Bayesians
were universal. In other words, both want to do the same thing: infer something
given partial information. Also, both views expect the probabilities to follow a basic
rule of logic: If the probability of A is greater than the probability of B; and the
probability of B is greater than C, then the probability of A should be greater than
that of C. This is called transitivity. We wish to rank them so that we can com-
pare them. Therefore, he asked the question, Is there a consistent mathematically
derivable way to assign probabilities?The answer to this was indeed yes and Cox
applied mathematical rigor on Laplaces logic. To do this Cox makes one assumption:
a proposition is either true or false. From this he applies the mathematical structure
which can be contained in two axioms:
Axiom 1: The plausibility that a proposition a given c is true must be related
to the negative of the proposition, not a or ~a; given c;
P(~ajc) = f(P(ajc)) ; (1.15)
where f(:) is a monotonic function, P(ajc) represents our belief in a given c; P(~ajc)
represents our belief in ~a given c and there exists a function f(:) that transforms
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P(ajc) into P(~ajc): This is also known as the negation relation.
Axiom 2: The plausibility that the proposition a and proposition b; given c
are true must be related to plausibility that proposition a given c is true and the
plausibility of proposition b given a and c is true,
P(a; bjc) = g(P(ajc);P(bja; c)) ; (1.16)
where g(:) is the monotonic function of transformation.
With these two axioms, we use Coxs First Theorem of Regraduation to attain,
p(a; bjc) = p(ajc)p(bja; c) ; (1.17)
and his Second Theorem of Regraduation to attain,
p(ajc) + p(~ajc) = 1 ; (1.18)
where we now call p(:) a probability in the Laplacian sense of the word. For brevity we
write the result without proof. However, we point the reader to [8] where Cox clearly
and thoroughly wrote his proof in detail. The result (1.17) is called the product rule
and (1.18) is called the sum rule or normalization rule. We can arrive at a relation
similar to the Kolmogorov sum rule [9] by using the product and normalization rule
along with the relation,
(^a+ b) = ~a~b ; (1.19)
which says that if the statement (a or b) is FALSE then the both a and b must also
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be FALSE . The proof is trivial,
p(a+ bjc) = 1  p(~a~bjc) = 1  p(~ajc)p(~bj~a; c) = 1  p(~ajc)(1  p(bj~a; c)) (1.20)
= p(ajc) + p(~a; bjc) = p(ajc) + p(bjc)p(~ajbc) = p(ajc) + p(bjc)(1  p(ajbc))
= p(ajc) + p(bjc)  p(a; bjc):
which is often called the sum rule where (1.18) is simply called the normalization
rule.
There are two main reasons why these derivations of the sum and product rules
are so powerful. First, there is no mention of priors or frequencies. Second, they are
a result of mathematical consistency. In other words, when a result can be calculated
two di¤erent ways, the resultsmust agree. Therefore, if one wishes to use probabilities
for the purposes of inference, then the only rules that can be used to manipulate those
probabilities are the sum and the product rule or regraduations thereof. Any other
rules would be inconsistent. We can now write,
p(ajc)p(bja; c) = p(bjc)p(ajb; c) ; (1.21)
due to the symmetry in the 2nd axiom. Dividing both sides by p(ajc) yields,
p(bja; c) = p(bjc)p(ajb; c)
p(ajc) ; (1.22)
which is Laplaces BayesTheorem. Therefore, Bayestheorem is a result of math-
ematical consistency. We apply modern labels to the pieces by calling p(bja; c) the
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posterior, p(bjc) the prior, p(ajb; c) the likelihood and p(ajc) we call the evidence or
the normalization.
It should be noted that all the results in this section on Cox could be written
without the probabilities and functions conditional on c. For example BayesTheorem
could be written as
p(bja) = p(b)p(ajb)
p(a)
: (1.23)
However, the extra conditionalization throughout is intended. Probabilities only
have meaning when they are in a specic context. To borrow somewhat fromAristotle;
probabilities abhor a vacuum.
1.5 Summary
We started this chapter suggesting that the reason we use probabilities is because we
wish to learn. So far we have only considered how to assign probabilities consistently,
but not about learning from new information. Laplace said that the weighthe as-
signed to the likelihood was due to prior information. Thus, he did not only generalize
Bernoulli, he attempted to generalized how we learn. The weight or old information
(the prior) is a probability that reects old information. We take this old probability
and multiply it by the likelihood (our model with data put into it) in order to get a
new probability assignment, or an updated probability (after normalization).
However, there are two problems. The rst is that we still have not justied the
use of PIR to assign prior probabilities. The second is that we get information in
forms other than data. For example, in thermodynamics, the key to determining the
probability distribution for a gas in thermal equilibrium is knowing that the relevant
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information is the expected energy. Yet this is not data. Therefore, how do we update
our probabilities with information in other forms? The solution to the rst problem
comes in the next chapter and the solution to the second, a further generalization of
how we updateour probabilities, comes in chapter 4.
Finally, we must address the confusion regarding terminology such as, degrees of
belief, subjective and objective probabilities. Some do not like degrees of beliefas
describing probabilities because they think, How can what you believea¤ect the
outcome concerning a physical object?In a similar vein, How can the probability
of a physical object be subject to a particular person?The confusion rests purely in
the connotation of the words being used. Let us give our denition of a probability:
Denition: A probability is an abstract notion that represents the degree of
plausibility of a proposition, subject to information regarding that proposition.
It is abstract because it is a representation of our uncertainty. The object is
certainly going to do something; its just that we will never be certain what that
somethingwill be. It is a degreebecause, as we have already mentioned, it is when
we compare probabilities that they have meaning. Also, we want the degrees to be
transitive so that we can compare them consistently.
Therefore, by using beliefinstead of plausibilityor subjectinstead of given,
we do not change how probabilities are used. Notice, they are subject to the in-
formation, not the people. Of course, it is very reasonable that people who receive
di¤erent information may assign di¤erent probabilities. However, if they have the
same information (same data, model and prior) and use the same method to process
that information then they must calculate the same probabilities. Any other way is
15
inconsistent and thus, useless.
We note that others continue to explore alternative approaches, such as lattice
theory, to explain probabilities [10].
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Chapter 2
Thermodynamic Entropy vs
Statistical Mechanics
Boltzmann extends the subject thermodynamics, by introducing probabilities. Gibbs
called this extended subject statistical mechanicsand cleaned up some issues with
Boltzmanns derivations. However, each of the participants were reading each others
papers, which makes it di¢ cult to determine who did what and when. Boltzmann
often (unfairly) gets the lion share of credit in most textbooks. Here we again highlight
the key concepts of how these ideas were introduced and came about.
2.1 Ludwig Edward Boltzmann (18441906)
Many authors have tried to sort out what Boltzmann thought and when he thought it
[11]. For example, he was the rst to introduce the use of probabilities into entropy,
probably due to reading Maxwell [12]. However, in his writings he uses completely
di¤erent denitions of probability. Sometimes he used di¤erent denitions in the same
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paper and worse, in the same equation. With this in mind, we attempt to summarize
Boltzmanns contribution to entropy with modern notation.
Thermodynamic Entropy
In 1871, building on the theory of gases, Boltzmann decided to use the average of
the energy to represent the relevant information needed for this macroscopic entropy
[13],
E = hHi =
Z
dNPNH ; (2.1)
where H is the Hamiltonian, dN = d3Nxd3Np is the phase space volume element and
PN is the distribution function. At this point he suggests that PN might be similar
to the velocity distribution and writes,
PN =
exp( H)
Z
; (2.2)
where Z =
R
dNe
 H ,  = 1=T (the constant k had not be determined yet). This
leads to
E =
3
2
NkT + hUi ; (2.3)
where U is the potential in the Hamiltonian.
Connecting this to Clausius thermodynamic entropy [14] is now di¢ cult since
work, W; is based on a microscopic theory (kinetic theory) while heat is thought of
as a macroscopic quantity. The key is that any energy exchange, E; needs to be
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separated into two components, heat and work. To do this we di¤erentiate (2.1),
E =
Z
dNPNH +
Z
dNHPN ; (2.4)
where the second integral can be written as hHi = hUi and comes solely from
changes in the potential. This is identied as work, since the change in potential
energy is work, W: Following energy conservation, it must be then that the second
integral is heat, Q: Therefore,
E = Q+ hUi : (2.5)
Substituting (2.3) into (2.5) yields,
Q =
3
2
NkT +  hUi   hUi : (2.6)
Dividing both sides by T yields,
Q
T
=

3
2
NkT +  hUi   hUi

=T : (2.7)
This implies that the right side should be a form for the thermodynamic entropy, S.
In fact, (2.7) can be rewritten as
S =
E
T
+ logZ + C ; (2.8)
where C is a constant. This is the modern form for thermodynamic entropy.
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Statistical Mechanics
Through his work above, Boltzmann now has a clear understanding that the argu-
ments for a mechanical theory of heat rest not in the specic mechanics of the particles
themselves, but in looking at the probabilities representing the energetic states of the
particles. In 1877 he considers an unrealizable ction [15]. He envisions that the
phase space of a single particle can be divided intom cells, each with energy "i; where
i = 1; 2 : : :m: The i indicates a particular microstate. He further imagines that there
are N particles in this space with ni particles occupying the ith cell. He then assumes
that each cell, has an equal chanceof being occupied by a particular particle.1 He
then went on to propose that the distribution of particles for a particular macrostate
is proportional to the multiplicity for that macrostate,
W =
N !Qm
i=1 ni!
: (2.9)
If ni is very large, we may apply Stirlings approximation which yields
logW = N logN  N  
mP
i=1
(ni log ni   ni) : (2.10)
Since we know that
Pm
i=1 ni = N; we can rewrite this as
logW = N logN  
mP
i=1
ni log ni ; (2.11)
1Although Boltzmann did not use the principle of insu¢ cient reason, we can make the claim that
his argument for equally likelyhas to do with lack of information which sounds a lot like PIR.
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and nally,
logW =  N
mP
i=1
ni
N
log
ni
N
: (2.12)
Boltzmanns entropy is written as,
logW =  N
mP
i=1
fi log fi ; (2.13)
where fi = ni=N:
Next Boltzmann maximized the log of his multiplicity by using the calculus of
variations (CoV). He attempted to nd the function, f , that maximized logW; given
what he knew about the system. For this exercise, he assumed he had a closed system.
Therefore, the total number of particles, N; and the total energy of the system, E;
was xed. We write these constraints as
mP
i=1
ni = N ; (2.14)
and
mP
i=1
nii = E : (2.15)
By CoV (or as Gibbs called it, the variational principle), we will now vary fi in
(2.13) and include the constraint information by way of Lagrange multipliers (; ),.so
that logW is maximized,
logW = logW   

mP
i=1
ni  N

  

mP
i=1
nii   E

:
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For convenience, we divide by N so that we have
1
N
logW =
1
N
logW   

mP
i=1
fi   1

  

mP
i=1
fii   E
N

; (2.16)
0 = 
1
N
logW = 

 
mP
i=1
fi log fi   

mP
i=1
fi   1

  

mP
i=1
fii   E
N

; (2.17)
0 =  
mP
i=1
log(fi)fi  
mP
i=1
fi
1
fi
fi   
mP
i=1
fi   
mP
i=1
ifi ; (2.18)
so that we are left with,
0 =
mP
i=1
(  log fi   1    i) fi ; (2.19)
where the inside of the summation must be zero. Therefore,
fi = e
 1 e i ; (2.20)
and using (2.14) we have our nal result,
fi =
1
Z
e i ; (2.21)
where Z =
Pm
i=1 e
 i and  is determined by (2.15). This is Boltzmanns version of
the canonical distribution where (2.21) is the probabilityof one particle being in the
ith microstate.
Additionally, for a gas, we have his nal form,
logW =  N
Z
d 1f(x; p) log f(x; p) ; (2.22)
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where d 1 = d3xd3p:
One can see an immediate problem with this frequentist view; what if the particles
interact? Also, there is no mention of irreversibility. The Hamiltonian that Boltzmann
uses is denitely time reversible. Where does the second law come into his denition?
Boltzmann clearly was the person that rst abandons a mechanical argument to
describe entropy, but these problems would haunt Boltzmann to the end of his tragic
days. For a detailed description see [16]. As a side note, it was Max Plank who rst
wrote S = k log 
; where 
 = W and established the constant k [17].
2.2 Josiah Willard Gibbs (18391903)
Intermingled in Boltzmanns accomplishments were Gibbs revelations. One thing
Gibbs realized was that Boltzmanns distribution failed to take into account interac-
tions between particles. Gibbs imagined an ensemble of all the possible congurations
of a system of N particles with each conguration being a potential microstate, i; of
the entire system. The macrostate of the system is characterized by a probability dis-
tribution of an ensemble. Gibbsstated that the preferred macrostate is the one that
maximizes the entropy given some constraints. In fact, he made the bold prediction
that entropy does not just tendto increase, as Clausius stated, but must increase.
Thus, the entropy that will allow for interacting particles is,
S[f ] =  
mP
i=1
fi log fi ; (2.23)
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where fi is some function that represents the probability for the system to be in a
certain energy state, "i and i represents an N particle microstate, unlike (2.13) This
is GibbsEntropy [18].
Furthermore, the correct entropy for a gas that will allow for interacting particles
is,
S[f ] =  
Z
df(x; p) log f(x; p) ; (2.24)
where d = d3Nxd3Np and f(x; p) is some function that represents a probability
distribution for a particle including all possible interactions.
Gibbs realized that we can seldom get the exact total energy of a closed system; but
the expectation of the total energy seems reasonable since we can measure temperature
quite accurately. Then (2.14) and (2.15) would be written as,
mP
i=1
fi = 1
mP
i=1
fiEi = hEi ; (2.25)
where Ei represents the energy of the ith state and we would write (2.21) as,
fi =
1
Z
e Ei ; (2.26)
where Z =
Pm
i=1 e
 Ei and  is determined by (2.25) and the thermodynamic identity
so that  = 1=T . We refer to (2.26) as the more familiar version of the canonical
ensemble. Instead of a set of xed, equal energy states, "i, we have a variable, Ei; that
represents the energy of the ith state. Note that this iis a di¤erent one than those
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in (2.21). Additionally, one need not have a closed system. Since we are dealing with
the expected energy, it can uctuate and even exchange energy with another system.
Also, by adding another constraint, we can exchange particles, Ni; as well,
mP
i=1
fiNi = hNii ; (2.27)
so that,
fi =
1
Z
e Ei Ni ; (2.28)
where  is determined by (2.27) and the thermodynamic identity so that  =  =T;
where  is the chemical potential. We refer to (2.28) as the grand canonical ensemble.
We hope it is clear that although we continued to use the notation from Boltzmann,
fi; it is not, in general, a frequency. Although we did not need a frequency in our
derivation, Gibbs thought of the function, fi as a frequency that represented the
probability distribution of an imaginary ensemble. To see a detailed explanation
of why Gibbsentropy is the correct entropy that actually leads to Clausiusentropy,
read the brilliant paper by Jaynes [19].
Finally, we end this section by emphasizing two points from Gibbswork: 1) We do
not have to assume that (2.23) or (2.24) only hold when the system is at equilibrium,
only that entropy is must increase [20] or that we must maximize the entropy given
a set of constraints. 2) The distribution that we get in the end is based on our
information, not what is or is not true. Meaning that they are guesses. But, they
are our best guesses. If they agree with experiment, then we have all of the relevant
information for that experiment. If they do not agree with experiment, we have not
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failed but discovered somethingnew. Therefore, entropy can be used as a tool to
learn.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we made no mention of ergodic theory or so called coarse graining.
There was no need. Boltzmann tried to get around using the principle of insu¢ cient
reason by using his ergodic hypothesis. Unfortunately it is truly an unrealizable
ctionthat can never be proved by its own denition. Gibbs was and still is criticized
for failing to mention in his book how his theory meshes with ergodic hypothesis.
Although his health was failing rapidly at the time, he did not forget to mention it.
Additionally, it must be noted that we do not createa view of the system by an
arbitrary or articial coarse graining. Entropy does not need PIR, ergodic theory
or so called coarse graining, it only needs the information that one can measure.
Our inference about the system is determined by how much information we have at
hand. If we had all information regarding the system we could determine energy
states, exactly (at least classically and perhaps in the future, quantum mechanically
as well).
Last, we rephrase the last comment in the section on Gibbs: We now have tools
to learn something. Entropy is a tool for learning. In the cases above we are usually
discussing gases. However, that is only because it is information regarding gases that
we have examined. In the next chapter we will start to show that the concept of
entropy can be used to learn much more.
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Chapter 3
Information entropy
In the rst chapter we focused on probabilities. However, we did not discus how
one deals with information in the form of constraints such as an expected value. In
the second chapter, we saw that the concept of entropy was used for determining
probabilities related to gases by way of constraint information. In this chapter, these
ideas start to come together to form a cohesive, general methodology.
3.1 Claude Elwood Shannon (19162001)
Claude Shannon worked on radar for the U.S. government during WWII. Afterwards,
he was interested in the most e¢ cient way to encode a message and how much of it
would be received. What he came up with was what he called his uncertaintyabout
the signal [21]. He approached this problem in an interesting way. Instead of creating
a mathematical formalism, then trying to explain how it applies to his situation, he
described what a method should be able to do, then created a mathematical formalism
to represent it.
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Let i be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, such as energy
states. Yet the state of the system is unknown. We assign a probability for this state,
pi; given some initial (yet insu¢ cient) information, I; so that pi = p(ijI). It would
seem reasonable that we would be more uncertain if the probability distribution was
broadly peaked, than if it was sharply peaked. How do we determine the amount of
information that we need in order to get a sharp peak? Could we dene a measure
that would be consistent. Would it be unique?
Consider a discrete set of m; mutually exclusive and exhaustive discrete alterna-
tives, i = 1; 2 : : :m, each with probability pi. Shannon claimed that any measure,
S; of the amount of information that is missing when all we know is a probability
distribution must satisfy three axioms:
Axiom 1 S is a real and continuous function of the probabilities pi, S[p] =
S (p1; : : : pm).
Axiom 2 If all pis are equal, then pi = 1=m. Thus, S = S (1=m; : : : ; 1=m) =
F (m), where F (m) is an monotonic increasing function of m.
The third axiom is a consistency requirement. We want the function, S[p]; to
measure the amount of additional information needed after I; to determine the state
of the system. Let us assume that the additional information could come in pieces
or segments. The consistency requirement is that the order in which these segments
come should not matter. Therefore, let us divide the number of states, m; into M
groups, so that g = 1; : : : ;M and that the probability for the system to be found in
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a particular group, g; is
Pg =
X
i2g
pi : (3.1)
Axiom 3 For all possible groupings g = 1; : : : ;M of the states i = 1; : : : ;m we
must have
S = SG +
P
g
PgSg : (3.2)
where SG is the amount of information needed to single out a particular group and
the summation is the expected amount of information needed to decide on the actual
i within the selected group g. This is called the groupingproperty.
For the sake of brevity, we omit the algebraic manipulation to attain Shannons
nal result. A brief derivation is given in the appendix of [22]. The unique function
that Shannon obtains, as a result of his axioms, to measure the missing amount of
information is
S[p] =  k
mP
i=1
pi log pi ; (3.3)
where k is a constant. John von Neumann examined Shannons results and told him
that uncertainty was a well dened quantity in physics and he should not call it
uncertainty. His suggestion was to call it entropy, since no one really knows what
entropy is anyway.1 For a detailed analysis of the applications of his theory, see [23].
1Shannons work used binary code, so he further dened his entropy as using a base 2 log, so
that log2=1 bit of information. Although it was one of Shannons colleagues, John Wilder Tukey
that coined the term bit, Shannon was the rst to publish it.
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3.2 Edwin Thompson Jaynes (19221998)
Now is the time when most of what we have been discussing comes to a head. In
1952, Brillouin noticed that it was not coincidental that Shannons information en-
tropy looked very similar to Gibbsentropy [24]. Agreeing with this, E. T. Jaynes
wrote that Shannons entropy is more than simply a device for measuring the uncer-
tainty in signals. He proclaimed that it was a generalization of all entropy concepts.
Furthermore, since Shannons entropy was derived by starting with logical assump-
tions (axioms), as opposed to developing a mathematical formalism rst, entropy
should be used a priori. In other words, when trying to learn something new (new
probabilities), we start with entropy and proceed from there. Following Je¤reysde-
nition of probabilities [25] (and therefore Laplaces) that were ratied by Cox, and
using Gibbsvariational principle, he suggested the following:
Let x be a set of discrete values, x = fx1 : : : xmg and pi be a corresponding
probability. We wish to know what the probability pi is, given that all we know is
the consistency requirement that all probabilities pertaining to x sum to one,
mX
i
pi = 1 : (3.4)
Using the variational principle, we can write the following,
S[p] = S[p]  

mP
i=1
pi   1

; (3.5)
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which, by maximizing (3.3), leads to
pi =
1
m
: (3.6)
This is the principle of insu¢ cient reason. We can extend this further to include
additional information that constrains what pi could be, such as the expectation of
some function of x,
hf(x)i =
mX
i
pi f(xi) : (3.7)
Using the variational principle again we get,
pi =
1
Z
e f(xi) ; (3.8)
where Z =
Pm
i=1 e
 f(xi) and  is determined by (3.7),
 @ logZ
@
= hf(x)i : (3.9)
Jaynes showed that this is exactly the procedure to attain the canonical (2.26) and
grand canonical (2.28) distributions. This method, called MaxEnt (for maximum
entropy), states that one should choose a probability that maximizes the Shannon
entropy given information in the form of constraints. Thus, Gibbsentropy is a special
case of this new methodology. It is critical to point out that the MaxEnt procedure
e¤ectively infers pi on the basis of some information. If we do not incorporate all the
relevant information into the procedure (we have incomplete information), then the
probability that we attain is a function which reects this partial knowledge.
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However, why choose the probability that maximizes the entropy? In Gibbs
case, an equilibrium argument could be used. However, what about cases of general
inference? The answer is that if entropy is thought of as a measure of information,
as Shannon described at times, then one should choose the probability that includes
the least amount of information, just the information given. In other words, other
probabilities could be chosen that satisfy the entropy and constraint information, but
the probability that maximizes the entropy is the least informative or as some say,
the most honest.
3.3 Relative Entropy
In 1951 Solomon Kullback (19031994) introduced an information measure [26] similar
to Shannons,
K[p] =
mX
i=1
p(x)i log
p(xi)
q(xi)
; (3.10)
where K[p] reects the distance(although not a distance in the true metric sense)
between two probability distributions, pi and qi. Additionally, we can examine the
continuous case,
K[p] =
Z
dx p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
: (3.11)
Here it should be noted that one cannot simply write,
S[p] =  
Z
dx p(x) log p(x) ; (3.12)
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for the continuous Shannon case because it is not invariant under coordinate trans-
formation. Jaynes later extended Shannons entropy to the continuous case,
S[p] =  
Z
dx p(x) log
p(x)
m(x)
; (3.13)
where x is a continuous variable and m(x) is an invariant measure2 function, pro-
portional to the limiting density of discrete points [27]. Thus, m(x) is necessary for
S[p] to remain invariant under coordinate transformations. With this mode of logic,
we can generalize Shannons entropy for the discrete case where,
S[p] =  
mX
i=1
p(x)i log
p(xi)
m(xi)
: (3.14)
Where m(xi) would be a constant for the discrete case,
S[p] =  
mX
i=1
p(x)i log p(xi) + const ; (3.15)
and the constant can be dropped as it does not a¤ect the ranking of the entropy.
3.4 Summary
Shannons entropy started to be used in many aspects of science. Unfortunately, like
most good things, it was abused. The old confusion about entropy in thermodynamics
resurfaced at this time. What was entropy? Was it what Clausius suggested? How
about what Boltzmann or Gibbs suggested? The easy explanation was that they
2The true invariant measure would be the density, dx m(x):
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are simply di¤erent entropies. However, if they are di¤erent, are they related? The
solution to this confusion is that they are di¤erent because they are used for di¤erent
purposes. However, the process or method, as outlined by Jaynes, is the same for
each solution. In other words, we use the same process but di¤erent information to
arrive at the various entropies. Thus, they are related because the process is the
same; entropy is a learning tool, nothing more.
It just so happened that at almost the same time, Bayesian statistics received an
enormous boost. Since the 1950s, with the works of Je¤reys, Cox, Ramsey [28], Savage
[29], DeFinetti [30] and Wald [31], Bayesian probabilities were shown to be superior
to frequentist approaches. The real problem was that they were di¢ cult to compute.
However, with the major increase in computing power in the 1980s and the rediscovery
of Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods in the 1990s, Bayesian methodology exploded
and interest in using information entropy to assign probabilities waned.
Still others have o¤ered interesting new perspectives regarding entropy recently.
For example, in the lattice theory approach, entropy is a measure on the lattice of
questions, which may give rise to a maximum entropy principle [32].
34
Part 2: Universal Inference
In 1980, Shore and Johnson realized that one could axiomatize the updating method
itself, instead of just the information measure as Shannon did [33]. The method they
developed was in contrast with the older MaxEnt method [22], which was designed
to assign rather than update probabilities. This was improved upon by others such
as John Skilling [34] and Ariel Caticha [35]. The method that came from these
improvements was called the method of Maximum (relative) Entropy (ME) and was
designed for updating probabilities when new information is given in the form of a
constraint on the family of allowed posteriors. Thus, ME is a tool for learning, like
BayesTheorem. However, the method was still limited to using information in the
form of constraints, unlike Bayes which was limited to information in the form of
data.
The major achievement that we will show in the following chapters is that ME
is capable of processing information in the form of constraints, like MaxEnt and
information in the form of data, as in BayesTheorem. Better still is the fact that
ME can process both forms simultaneously, which Bayes and MaxEnt cannot do
alone. Our objective in this part is to dene the ME method and illustrate the use
of ME by way of proof and example. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that in this
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approach, entropy is a tool for reasoning which requires no interpretation in terms of
heat, multiplicities, disorder, uncertainty, or amount of information.
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Chapter 4
Entropy as a tool for updating
probabilities
The core of this chapter has been previously published in [36].
Our objective is to devise a general method to update from a prior distribution
q(x) to a posterior distribution p(x) when new information becomes available. To
carry out the update we proceed by ranking the allowed probability distributions
according to increasing preference. This immediately raises two questions: (a) how
is the ranking implemented and (b) what makes one distribution preferable over
another? The answer to (a) is that any useful ranking scheme must be transitive
(if P1 is better than P2, and P2 is better than P3, then P1 is better than P3), and
therefore it can be implemented by assigning a real number S[P ] to each P in such
a way that if P1 is preferred over P2, then S[P1] > S[P2]. The preferred P is that
which maximizes the entropyS[P ]. This explains why entropies are real numbers
and why they are meant to be maximized.
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Question (b), the criterion for preference, is implicitly answered once the func-
tional form of the entropy S[P ] that denes the ranking scheme is chosen. The basic
strategy is inductive. We follow Skillings method of induction [34]: (1) If an entropy
S[P ] of universal applicability exists, it must apply to special examples. (2) If in a
certain example the best distribution is known, then this knowledge constrains the
form of S[P ]. Finally, (3) if enough examples are known, then S[P ] will be completely
determined. (Of course, the known examples might turn out to be incompatible with
each other, in which case there is no universal S[P ] that accommodates them all.)
The known special examples, which are called the axioms of ME, reect the
conviction that what was learned in the past is important and should not be easily
ignored. The chosen posterior distribution should coincide with the prior as closely as
possible and one should only update those aspects of ones beliefs for which corrective
new evidence has been supplied. The rst two axioms are listed below. (Detailed
proofs for the rst two axioms are found in [35].)
Axiom 1: Locality: Local information has local e¤ects.
When the new information does not refer to a domain D of the variable x the
conditional probabilities p(xjD) need not be revised. The consequence of the axiom
is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute additively to the entropy:
S[P ] =
Z
dxF (P (x); x) (4.1)
where F is some unknown function.
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Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance: The ranking should not depend on the
system of coordinates.
The coordinates that label the points x are arbitrary; they carry no information.
The consequence of this axiom is that S[P ] =
R
dxm(x)(P (x)=m(x)) involves coor-
dinate invariants such as dxm(x) and P (x)=m(x), where the functions m(x) (which
is a density) and  are, at this point, still undetermined.
Next we make a second use of the locality axiom and allow domain D to extend
over the whole space. Axiom 1 then asserts that when there is no new information
there is no reason to change ones mind. When there are no constraints the selected
posterior distribution should coincide with the prior distribution. This eliminates the
arbitrariness in the density m(x): up to normalization m(x) is the prior distribution,
m(x) / q(x).
In [35] the remaining unknown function  was determined using the following
axiom:
Old Axiom 3: Subsystem independence: When a system is composed of
subsystems that are believed to be independent it should not matter whether the in-
ference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Let us be very explicit about what this axiom means. Consider a system composed
of two subsystems which our prior evidence has led us to believe are independent.
This belief is reected in the prior distribution: if the subsystem priors are q1(x1) and
q2(x2), then the prior for the whole system is the product q1(x1)q2(x2). Furthermore
suppose that new information is acquired such that q1(x1) is updated to p1(x1) and
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that q2(x2) is updated to p2(x2). Nothing in this new information requires us to
revise our previous assessment of independence, therefore there is no need to change
our minds, and the function  must be such that the prior for the whole system
q1(x1)q2(x2) should be updated to p1(x1)p2(x2).
This idea is implemented as follows: First we treat the two subsystems separately.
Suppose that for subsystem 1 maximizing
S1[P1; q1] =
Z
dx1 q1(x1)

P1(x1)
q1(x1)

; (4.2)
subject to constraints C1 on the marginal distribution P1(x1) =
R
dx2 P (x1; x2) selects
the posterior p1(x1). The constraints C1 could, for example, include normalization, or
they could involve the known expected value of a function f1(x1),
Z
dx1f1(x1)P1(x1) =
Z
dx1dx2 f1(x1)P (x1; x2) = hf1(x1)i = F1 : (4.3)
Similarly, suppose that for subsystem 2 maximizing the corresponding S2[P2; q2] sub-
ject to constraints C2 on P2(x2) =
R
dx1 P (x1; x2) selects the posterior p2(x2).
Next we treat the subsystems jointly and maximize the joint entropy,
S[P; q1q2] =
Z
dx1dx2 q1(x1)q2(x2)

P (x1; x2)
q1(x1)q2(x2)

; (4.4)
subject to the precisely the same constraints on the joint distribution P . The function
 is determined by the requirement that the selected posterior be p1p2. As shown in
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[35] this leads to the logarithmic form
S[P; q] =  
Z
dxP (x) log
P (x)
q(x)
: (4.5)
Next we replace the old axiom 3 by an axiom which is more convincing because
it is an explicit requirement of consistency.
New Axiom 3: Consistency for independent subsystems: When a system
is composed of subsystems that are known to be independent it should not matter
whether the inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Again, we have to be very explicit about what this axiom means and how it di¤ers
from the old one. When the subsystems are treated separately the inference proceeds
exactly as described before: for subsystem 1 maximize the entropy S1[P1; q1] subject
to the constraints C1 to select a posterior p1 and similarly for subsystem 2 to select
p2. The important di¤erence is introduced when the subsystems are treated jointly.
Since we are only concerned with those special examples where we know that the
subsystems are independent, we are required to search for the posterior within the
restricted family of joint distributions that take the form of a product P = P1P2; this
is an additional constraint over and above the original C1 and C2.
In the previous case we chose  so as to maintain independence because there
was no evidence against it. Here we impose independence by hand as an additional
constraint for the stronger reason that the subsystems are known to be independent.
At rst sight it appears that the new axiom does not place as stringent a restriction
on the general form of : it would seem that  has been relieved of its responsibility
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of enforcing independence because it is up to us to impose it explicitly by hand.
However, as we shall see, the fact that we seek an entropy S of general applicability
and that we require consistency for all possible independent subsystems is su¢ ciently
restrictive.
The new constraint P = P1P2 is easily implemented by direct substitution. Instead
of maximizing the joint entropy, S[P; q1q2], we now maximize
S[P1P2; q1q2] =
Z
dx1dx2 q1(x1)q2(x2)

P1(x1)P2(x2)
q1(x1)q2(x2)

; (4.6)
under independent variations P1 and P2 subject to the same constraints C1 and C2
and we choose  by imposing that the updating leads to the posterior p1(x1)p2(x2).
4.1 Consistency for identical independent subsys-
tems
Here we show that applying the axiom to subsystems that happen to be identical
restricts the entropy functional to a member of the one-parameter family given by
S[P; q] =  
Z
dxP (x)

P (x)
q(x)

for  6=  1; 0 : (4.7)
Since entropies that di¤er by additive or multiplicative constants are equivalent in
that they induce the same ranking scheme, we could equally well have written
S[P; q] =
1
( + 1)

1 
Z
dxP +1q 

: (4.8)
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This is convenient because the entropies for  = 0 and  =  1 can be obtained by
taking the appropriate limits. For  ! 0 use y = exp  log y  1 +  log y to obtain
the usual logarithmic entropy, S0[P; q] = S[P; q] in (4.5). Similarly, for  !  1 we
get S 1[P; q] = S[q; P ].
The proof below is based upon and extends a previous proof by Karbelkar [37]. He
showed that belonging to the family of -entropies is a su¢ cient condition to satisfy
the consistency axiom for identical systems and he conjectured but did not prove
that this was also a necessary condition. Although necessity was not essential to his
argument it is crucial for ours because we are seeking the universal updating method.
We show below that for identical subsystems there are no acceptable entropies outside
this family.
Proof First we treat the subsystems separately. For subsystem 1 we maximize
the entropy S1[P1; q1] subject to normalization and the constraint C1 in (4.3). Intro-
duce Lagrange multipliers 1 and 1,


S1[P1; q1]  1
Z
dx1f1P1   F1

  1
Z
dx1 P1   1

= 0; (4.9)
which gives
0

P1(x1)
q1(x1)

= 1f1(x1) + 1 ; (4.10)
where the prime indicates a derivative with respect to the argument, 0(y) = d(y)=dy.
For subsystem 2 we need only consider the extreme situation where the constraints
C2 determine the posterior completely: P2(x2) = p2(x2).
Next we treat the subsystems jointly. The constraints C2 are easily implemented
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by direct substitution and thus, we maximize the entropy S[P1p2; q1q2] by varying
over P1 subject to normalization and the constraint C1 in (4.3). Introduce Lagrange
multipliers  and ,


S[P1p2; q1q2]  
Z
dx1f1P1   F1

  
Z
dx1 P1   1

= 0; (4.11)
which gives Z
dx2 p2
0

P1p2
q1q2

= [p2; q2]f1(x1) + [p2; q2] ; (4.12)
where the multipliers  and  are independent of x1 but could in principle be func-
tionals of p2 and q2:
The consistency condition that constrains the form of  is that if the solution to
(4.10) is p1(x1) then the solution to (4.12) must also be p1(x1), and this must be true
irrespective of the choice of p2(x2). Let us then consider a small change p2 ! p2+p2
that preserves the normalization of p2. First introduce a Lagrange multiplier 2 and
rewrite (4.12) as
Z
dx2 p2
0

p1p2
q1q2

  2
Z
dx2 p2   1

= [p2; q2]f1(x1) + [p2; q2] ; (4.13)
where we have replaced P1 by the known solution p1 and thereby e¤ectively trans-
formed (4.10) and (4.12) into an equation for . The p2(x2) variation gives,
0

p1p2
q1q2

+
p1p2
q1q2
00

p1p2
q1q2

=

p2
f1(x1) +

p2
+ 2 : (4.14)
44
Next use (4.10) to eliminate f1(x1),
0

p1p2
q1q2

+
p1p2
q1q2
00

p1p2
q1q2

= A[p2; q2]
0

p1
q1

+B[p2; q2] ; (4.15)
where
A[p2; q2] =
1
1

p2
and B[p2; q2] =   
p2
1
1
+

p2
+ 2 ; (4.16)
are at this point unknown functionals of p2 and q2. Di¤erentiating (4.15) with respect
to x1 the B term drops out and we get
A[p2; q2] =

d
dx1
0

p1
q1
 1
d
dx1

0

p1p2
q1q2

+
p1p2
q1q2
00

p1p2
q1q2

; (4.17)
which shows that A is not a functional of p2 and q2 but a mere function of p2=q2.
Substituting back into (4.15) we see that the same is true for B. Therefore (4.15) can
be written as
0 (y1y2) + y1y200 (y1y2) = A(y2)0 (y1) +B(y2) ; (4.18)
where y1 = p1=q1, y2 = p2=q2, and A(y2), B(y2) are unknown functions of y2. If we
specialize to identical subsystems for which we can exchange the labels 1$ 2, we get
A(y2)
0 (y1) +B(y2) = A(y1)0 (y2) +B(y1) : (4.19)
To nd the unknown functions A and B di¤erentiate with respect to y2,
A0(y2)0 (y1) +B0(y2) = A(y1)00 (y2) (4.20)
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and then with respect to y1 to get
A0(y1)
00 (y1)
=
A0(y2)
00 (y2)
= a = const : (4.21)
Integrating,
A(y1) = a
0 (y1) + b : (4.22)
Substituting A and B back into (4.20) and integrating gives
B0(y2) = b00 (y2) and B(y2) = b0 (y2) + c ; (4.23)
where b and c are constants. We can check that A(y) and B(y) are indeed solutions
of (4.19). Substituting into (4.18) gives
0 (y1y2) + y1y200 (y1y2) = a0 (y1) 0 (y2) + b [0 (y1) + 0 (y2)] + c : (4.24)
This is a peculiar di¤erential equation. We can think of it as one di¤erential equation
for 0 (y1) for each given constant value of y2 but there is a complication in that the
various (constant) coe¢ cients 0 (y2) are themselves unknown. To solve for ; choose
a xed value of y2, say y2 = 1,
y00 (y)  0 (y)   = 0 ; (4.25)
where  = a0 (1)+b 1 and  = b0 (1)+c. To eliminate the constant  di¤erentiate
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with respect to y,
y000 + (1  ) 00 = 0 ; (4.26)
which is a linear homogeneous equation and is easy to integrate. For a generic value
of  the solution is
00(y) / y 1 ) 0(y) = y +  : (4.27)
The constants  and  are chosen so that this is a solution of (4.24) for all values of
y2 (and not just for y2 = 1). Substituting into (4.24) and equating the coe¢ cients of
various powers of y1y2, y1, and y2 gives three conditions on the two constants  and
,
(1 + ) = a2; 0 = a + b;  = a2 + 2b + c : (4.28)
The nontrivial ( 6= 0) solutions are  = (1 + )=a and  =  b=a, while the third
equation gives c = b(1  b)=4a. We conclude that for generic values of  the solution
of (4.24) is
(y) =
1
a
y+1   b
a
y + C ; (4.29)
where C is a new constant. Choosing a =  (+1) and b = 1+Ca we obtain (4.8).
For the special values  = 0 and  =  1 one can either rst take the limit of
the di¤erential equation (4.26) and then nd the relevant solutions, or one can rst
solve the di¤erential equation for general  and then take the limit of the solution
(4.8) as described earlier. Either way one obtains (up to additive and multiplicative
constants which have no e¤ect on the ranking scheme) the entropies S0[P; q] = S[P; q]
and S 1[P; q] = S[q; P ].
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4.2 Consistency for non-identical subsystems
Let us summarize our results so far. The goal is to update probabilities by ranking
the distributions according to an entropy S that is of general applicability. The
functional form of the entropy S has been constrained down to a member of the one-
dimensional family S. One might be tempted to conclude (see [37, 4]) that there
is no S of universal applicability; that inferences about di¤erent systems could be
carried out with di¤erent -entropies. But we have not yet exhausted the full power
of our new axiom 3.
To proceed further we ask: What is ? Is it a property of the individual carrying
out the inference or of the system under investigation? The former makes no sense;
we insist that the updating must be objective in that di¤erent individuals with the
same prior and the same information must make the same inference. Therefore, the
remaining alternative is that the inference parameter,  must be a characteristic of
the system.
Consider two di¤erent systems characterized by 1 and 2. Let us further suppose
that these systems are independent (perhaps system 1 is here on Earth while the
other lives in a distant galaxy) so that they fall under the jurisdiction of the new
axiom 3; inferences about system 1 are carried out with S1 [P1; q1] while inferences
about system 2 require S2 [P2; q2]. For the combined system we are also required
to use an -entropy S[P1P2; q1q2]. The question is what  do we choose that will
lead to consistent inferences whether we treat the systems separately or jointly. The
results of the previous section indicate that a joint inference with S[P1P2; q1q2] is
equivalent to separate inferences with S[P1; q1] and S[P2; q2]. Therefore we must
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choose  = 1 and also  = 2 which is possible only when 1 = 2. But this is
not all: any other system whether here on Earth or elsewhere that happens to be
independent of the distant system 2 must also be characterized by the same inference
parameter  = 2 = 1 even if it is correlated with system 1. Thus all systems have
the same  whether they are independent or not.
The power of a consistency argument resides in its universal applicability: if a
general expression for S[P; q] exists then it must be of the form S[P; q] where  is
a universal constant. The remaining problem is to determine this universal . One
possibility is to determine  experimentally: are there systems for which inferences
based on a known value of  have repeatedly led to success? The answer is yes; they
are quite common.
The next step in our argument is provided by the work of Jaynes [22] who showed
that statistical mechanics and thus thermodynamics are theories of inference based
on the value  = 0. His method, called MaxEnt, can be interpreted as the special case
of the ME when one updates from a uniform prior using the Gibbs-Shannon entropy.
Thus, it is an experimental fact without any known exceptions that inferences about
all physical, chemical and biological systems that are in thermal equilibrium or close
to it can be carried out by assuming that  = 0. Let us emphasize that this is not
an obscure and rare example of purely academic interest; these systems comprise
essentially all of natural science. (Included is every instance where it is useful to
introduce a notion of temperature.)
In conclusion: consistency for non-identical systems requires that  be a universal
constant and there is abundant experimental evidence for its value being  = 0. Other
-entropies may be useful for other purposes but the logarithmic entropy S[P; q] in
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(4.5) provides the only consistent ranking criterion for updating probabilities that
can claim general applicability.
4.3 Summary
We have shown that Skillings method of induction has led to a unique general theory
of inductive inference, the MEmethod. The whole approach is extremely conservative.
First, the axioms merely instruct us what not to update do not change your mind
except when forced by new information. Second, the validity of the method does not
depend on any particular interpretation of the notion of entropy.
We improve on the previous derivation [35] by adopting a considerably weaker
axiom that deals with independent subsystems. This axiom is phrased similarly to
the one proposed by Shore and Johnson [33]: When two systems are independent it
should not matter whether the inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
The merit of such a consistency axiom is that it is very compelling.
Nevertheless, the mathematical implementation of the Shore and Johnson axiom
has been criticized by Karbelkar [37] and by U¢ nk [4]. In their view it fails to single
out the usual logarithmic entropy as the unique tool for updating. It merely restricts
the form of the entropy to a one-dimensional continuum labeled by a parameter .
The resulting -entropies are equivalent to those proposed by Renyi [38] and by Tsallis
[39] in the sense that they update probabilities in the same way.
However, this chapter went beyond the insights of Karlbelkar and U¢ nk, and
showed that our consistency axiom selects a unique, universal value for the parameter
 and this value ( = 0) corresponds to the usual logarithmic entropy. The advantage
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of our approach is that it shows precisely how it is that -entropies with  6= 0 are
ruled out as tools for updating.
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Chapter 5
Bayes updating
The core of this chapter has been previously published in [36].
Once again, our objective is to devise a general method to update from a prior
distribution to a posterior distribution when new information is obtained. We start
this section by drawing a distinction between Bayes theorem, which is a straight-
forward consequence of the product rule for probabilities, and Bayesrule, which is
a method to update from a prior distribution to a posterior distribution when we
have information in the form of data. Although BayesTheorem is used for updating,
Coxs derivation makes no mention of updating. It is simply a relationship between
conditional probabilities. This distinction is mostly pedagogical yet important.
We show that Bayesrule can be derived as a special case of the ME method, a
result that was rst obtained by Williams [42, 43] long before the logical status of
the ME method had been su¢ ciently claried. The virtue of our derivation, which
hinges on translating information in the form of data into constraints that can be
processed using ME, is that it is particularly clear. It throws light on Bayesrule and
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demonstrates its complete compatibility with ME updating. A slight generalization
of the same ideas shows that Je¤reysupdating rule is also a special case of the ME
method.
5.1 Bayestheorem and Bayesrule
The goal here is to update our beliefs about the values of one or several quantities
 2  on the basis of observed values of variables x 2 X and of the known relation
between them represented by a specic model. The rst important point to make is
that attention must be focused on the joint distribution Pold(x; ). Indeed, being a
consequence of the product rule, Bayestheorem requires that Pold(x; ) be dened
and that assertions such as x and be meaningful; the relevant space is neither X
nor  but the product X . The label oldis important. It has been attached to
the joint distribution Pold(x; ) because this distribution codies our beliefs about x
and about  before the information contained in the actual data has been processed.
The standard derivation of Bayestheorem invokes the product rule,
Pold(x; ) = Pold(x)Pold(jx) = Pold()Pold(xj) ; (5.1)
so that
Pold(jx) = Pold()Pold(xj)
Pold(x)
: (Bayestheorem)
It is important to realize that at this point there has been no updating. Our beliefs
have not changed. All we have done is rewrite what we knew all along in Pold(x; ).
Bayestheorem is an identity that follows from requirements on how we should consis-
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tently assign degrees of belief. Whether the justication of the product rule is sought
through Coxs consistency requirement and regraduation or through a Dutch book
betting coherence argument, the theorem is valid irrespective of whatever data will
be or has been collected. Our notation, with the label oldthroughout, makes this
point explicit.
The real updating from the old prior distribution Pold() to a new posterior dis-
tribution Pnew() occurs when we take into account the values of x that have actually
been observed, which we will denote, x0. This requires a new assumption and the
natural choice is that the updated distribution Pnew() be given by Bayesrule,
Pnew() = Pold(jx0) : (Bayes rule)
Combining Bayestheorem with Bayesrule leads to the standard equation for Bayes
updating,
Pnew() = Pold()
Pold(x
0j)
Pold(x0)
: (5.2)
The assumption embodied in Bayesrule is extremely reasonable: we maintain those
old beliefs about  that are consistent with data values that have turned out to be
true. Data values that were not observed are discarded because they are now known
to be false.
This argument is indeed so compelling that it may seem unnecessary to seek any
further justication for the Bayesrule assumption. However, we deal here with such
a basic algorithm for information processing it is fundamental to all experimental
science that even such a self evident assumption should be carefully examined and
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its compatibility with the ME method should be veried.
5.2 Updating with data using the ME method
In Bayesian inference, it is assumed that one always has a prior probability based on
some prior information. When new information is obtained, the old probability (the
prior) is updated to a new probability (the posterior). If one has no prior information,
then one uses an ignorant1 prior [44]. Therefore, our rst concern when using the
ME method to update from a prior to a posterior distribution is to dene the space
in which the search for the posterior will be conducted. We wish to infer something
about the values of one or several quantities,  2 , on the basis of three pieces of
information: prior information about  (the prior), the known relationship between x
and  (the model), and the observed values of the data x 2 X . Since we are concerned
with both x and , the relevant space is neither X nor  but the product X  and
our attention must be focused on the joint distribution P (x; ). The selected joint
posterior Pnew(x; ) is that which maximizes the entropy,
S[P; Pold] =  
R
dxd P (x; ) log
P (x; )
Pold(x; )
; (5.3)
1Ignorant priors are used in common practice. However, term ignorant prior is loaded with
controversy. What is an ignorantprior? One argument is that one always knows some information,
such as the likelihood. In which case we may use a Je¤reys prior. Or perhaps a at prior is
appropriate, which we use in examples out of convenience. We do not hope to end this debate here
where our focus is on the process of updating.
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subject to the appropriate constraints. Pold(x; ) contains our prior information which
we call the joint prior. To be explicit,
Pold(x; ) = Pold()Pold(xj) ; (5.4)
where Pold() is the traditional Bayesian prior and Pold(xj) is the likelihood. It is
important to note that they both contain prior information. The Bayesian prior is
dened as containing prior information. However, the likelihood is not traditionally
thought of in terms of prior information. Of course it is reasonable to see it as such
because the likelihood represents the model (the relationship between  and x) that
has already been established. Thus we consider both pieces, the Bayesian prior and
the likelihood to be prior information.
The new information is the observed data, x0, which in the ME framework must
be expressed in the form of a constraint on the allowed posteriors. The family of
posteriors that reects the fact that x is now known to be x0 is such that
P (x) =
R
d P (x; ) = (x  x0) : (5.5)
This amounts to an innite number of constraints on P (x; ): for each value of x
there is one constraint and one Lagrange multiplier (x).
Maximizing (5.3), subject to the constraints (5.5) plus normalization,


S + 
R
dxd P (x; )  1+ R dx (x) R d P (x; )  (x  x0)	 = 0 ; (5.6)
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yields the joint posterior,
Pnew(x; ) =
1
Z
Pold(x; ) e
(x) ; (5.7)
where Z is a normalization constant,
Z = e +1 =
R
dxd Pold(x; ) e
(x) ; (5.8)
and (x) is determined from (5.5),
1
Z
R
d Pold(x; ) e
(x) =
1
Z
Pold(x) e
(x) = (x  x0) : (5.9)
The nal expression for the joint posterior is determined by substituting e(x) back
into (5.7),
Pnew(x; ) =
Pold(x; ) (x  x0)
Pold(x)
= (x  x0)Pold(jx) ; (5.10)
and the marginal posterior distribution for  is
Pnew() =
R
dxPnew(x; ) = Pold(jx0) ; (5.11)
which is the familiar Bayesconditionalization rule.
To summarize: Pold(x; ) = Pold(x)Pold(jx) is updated to Pnew(x; ) = Pnew(x)Pnew(jx)
with Pnew(x) = (x   x0) xed by the observed data while Pnew(jx) = Pold(jx) re-
mains unchanged. We see that in accordance with the minimal updating philosophy
that drives the ME method one only updates those aspects of ones beliefs for which
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corrective new evidence (in this case, the data) has been supplied.
Example Laplaces Succession Rule
Here we demonstrate how ME would be used in a problem that is traditionally solved
using Bayes Rule: A k-sided die has been tossed n times and the ith side comes up mi
times. Given this information, we would like to determine the probability of getting
the ith side in the next toss, i. We rewrite (5.3) to reect our information,
S[P; Pold] =  
X
m
Z
d P (m; jn) log P (m; jn)
Pold(m; jn) (5.12)
where m = (m1; : : : ;mk) with
Pk
i=1mi = n, and  = (1; : : : ; k) with
Pk
i=1 i = 1:
We write the constraints (note the use of the Kronecker delta for the discrete case of
the die), X
m
Z
d P (m; jn) = 1 : (5.13)
P (mjn) =
Z
d P (m; jn) = mm0 ; (5.14)
where m0 is the actual observed quantity. Now we maximize the entropy given the
constraints with respect to P (m; jn),

8>>><>>>:
S + 
P
m
R
d P (m; jn)  1

+
P
m
m
R
d P (m; jn)  mm0

9>>>=>>>; = 0 ; (5.15)
so that the selected posterior is
Pnew(m; jn) = 1
Z
Pold(m; jn) em ; (5.16)
58
where the normalization Z; is
Z = e +1 =
X
m
Z
d Pold(m; jn) em ; (5.17)
and the Lagrange multipliers m are determined from (5.14),
1
Z
Z
d Pold(m; jn) em = 1
Z
Pold(mjn) em = mm0 : (5.18)
Therefore, substituting em back into (5.16),
Pnew(m; jn) = Pold(m; jn) mm0
Pold(mjn) = mm
0Pold(jm;n) : (5.19)
The new marginal distribution for  is
Pnew() =
P
m
dPnew(m; jn) = Pold(jm0; n) : (5.20)
We need to determine Pold(jm0; n). We start by using the product rule,
Pold(jm0; n) = Pold(jn)Pold(m
0j; n)
Pold(m0jn) : (5.21)
This is of course Bayesrule. The marginal likelihood, Pold(m0jn) (also called the evi-
dence) is simply a normalization constant. Dice are modeled in terms of multinomial
distributions. The probability that casting a k-sided die n times yieldingmi instances
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for the ith face is
Pold(mj) = Pold(m1:::mkj1:::k; n) = n!
m1!:::mk!
m11 :::
mk
k ; (5.22)
For our problem, we will let i = ;
kP
j 6=i
j = (1 ) and mi = m. The particular form
of Pold(jn) is not important for our current purpose so for the sake of deniteness
we can choose it at, and in this case, constant. Being a constant, the prior can
come out of the integral and cancel with the same constant in the numerator. Now
Pold(jm0; n) from (5.20) can be written as
Pnew() = Pold(jm0; n) =

n
m0

m
0
(1  )n m0
1R
0

n
m0

~
m0
(1  ~)n m0d~
=
m
0
(1  )n m0
1R
0
~
m0
(1  ~)n m0d~
; (5.23)
where the denominator can be solved using a beta function, B,
B(p; q) =
1Z
0
tp 1
0
(1  t)q 1dt = (p  1)!(q   1)!
(p+ q   1)! (5.24)
where we let p = m+ 1 and q = n m+ 1. The result is
Pnew() =
(n+ 1)!
m0!(n m0)!
m0(1  )n m0 : (5.25)
It is important to note that Pnew() is the probability distribution of all possible
0s. Therefore, we cannot determine without certainty the value of . However, we
can choose to summarize our uncertain state of knowledge by identifying the  that
is most likely to give us the best results in experiments involving : There are
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traditionally three methods used for this choice: the mean, the mode and the median.
To determine the mean value for the parameter,  for this problem, we use
hi =
1Z
0
d Pnew() : (5.26)
For our example, this we have,
hi = m+ 1
n+ 2
: (5.27)
This result is also called the Laplace succession rule.
Example Je¤reysConditioning Rule
In this example we consider a slightly more general situation where there is some
uncertainty about some data that was collected. In this case, the marginal P (x) in
(5.5) is not a  function but a known distribution, PD(x): Therefore, the constraints
are
P (x) =
R
d P (x; ) = PD(x) : (5.28)
The selected posterior is still given by (5.7) with Z given by (5.8) but the multi-
pliers (x) are now determined from (5.28),
R
d Pold(x; )
e(x)
Z
= Pold(x)
e(x)
Z
= PD(x) ; (5.29)
so that
e(x) = Z
PD(x)
Pold(x)
: (5.30)
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Next substitute into (5.7),
Pnew(x; ) =
Pold(x; )
Pold(x)
PD(x) = Pold(jx)PD(x) (5.31)
The new marginal distribution for  is
Pnew() =
R
dxPnew(x; ) =
R
dxPold(jx)PD(x) ; (5.32)
as expected. This is known as Je¤reys rule of conditioning. It amounts to setting
Pnew(x; ) = Pnew(jx)Pnew(x) ; (5.33)
with the actual updating being Pnew(jx) = Pold(jx) and Pnew(x) = PD(x).
5.3 Summary
We explored the compatibility of Bayes and ME updating. After pointing out the
distinction between Bayestheorem and the Bayesupdating rule, we showed that
Bayesrule is a special case of ME updating by translating information in the form of
data into constraints that can be processed using ME. This implies that ME is capable
of reproducing every aspect of orthodox Bayesian inference and proves the complete
compatibility of Bayesian and entropy methods.
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Chapter 6
Universal updating
The core of this chapter has been previously published in [45]
When using Bayesrule, it is quite common to impose constraints on the prior
distribution. In some cases these constraints are also satised by the posterior distri-
bution, but these are special cases. In general, constraints imposed on priors do not
propagateto the posteriors. Although Bayesrule can handle some constraints, we
seek a procedure capable of enforcing any constraint on the posterior distributions.
Thus, in the past, Bayess Rule has been used when information in the form of data
is present.
MaxEnt was used when information in the form of constraints (such as moments)
was present and then only to assign probabilities. The ME method extended this
method so that one could update from a prior to a posterior when constraint in-
formation was obtained. However, the relationship between these two methods has
always been controversial, even though it is common practice to use MaxEnt to assign
priors.
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In the previous chapter we proved that Bayes is a special case of ME and therefore
the compatibility of the methods. In this chapter, we do something that to our
knowledge has never been done: We update with data and constraints simultaneously.
When using ME to achieve this, we arrive at a nal result that is the canonical
form of the posterior distribution.
This result is deceivingly simple: the likelihood is modied by a canonicalexpo-
nential factor. Although this result is very simple, it should be handled with caution:
once we consider several sources of information such as multiple constraints we must
confront the problem of non-commutivity. We discuss the question of whether they
should be processed simultaneously, or sequentially, and in what order. Our gen-
eral conclusion is that these di¤erent alternatives correspond to di¤erent states of
information and accordingly we expect that they will lead to di¤erent inferences.
To illustrate the di¤erences, a multinomial example of die tosses is solved in some
detail for two problems. They appear supercially similar but are in fact very dif-
ferent. The rst die problem requires that the constraints be processed sequentially.
This corresponds to the familiar situation of using MaxEnt to derive a prior and then
using Bayes to process data. The second die problem, which requires that the con-
straints be processed simultaneously, provides a clear example that lies beyond the
reach of Bayesrule or MaxEnt alone.
6.1 The Canonical Form
Here we process two forms of information: expected values and data, simultaneously.
For simplicity we will refer to these expected values as moments although they can
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be considerably more general. The solution resembles BayesRule. In fact, if there
are no moment constraints then the method produces Bayes rule exactly. If there is
no data, then the MaxEnt solution is produced.
We generalize the results of the previous chapter to include additional information
about  in the form of a constraint on the expected value of some function f(),
R
dxd P (x; )f() = hf()i = F : (6.1)
We emphasize that constraints imposed at the level of the prior need not be satised
by the posterior. What we do here di¤ers from the standard Bayesian practice in
that we require the constraint to be satised by the posterior distribution.
Maximizing the joint entropy, (5.3), subject to normalization, the data constraint,
P (x) =
R
d P (x; ) = (x  x0) ; (6.2)
and the moment constraint (6.1),

8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
S + 
R
dxd P (x; )  1
+
R
dxd P (x; )f()  F 
+
R
dx(x)
R
d P (x; )  (x  x0)
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
= 0 (6.3)
yields the joint posterior,
Pnew(x; ) = Pold(x; ) e
 1+(x)+f() : (6.4)
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The rst Lagrange multiplier is determined by substituting (6.4) into the normaliza-
tion constraint
R
dxd P (x; ) = 1 which yields,
Z = e +1 =
Z
dxde(x)+f()Pold(x; ) (6.5)
and (6.4) can be rewritten as
Pnew(x; ) =
1
Z
Pold(x; ) e
(x)+f() : (6.6)
The Lagrange multipliers (x) are determined by substituting (6.6) into (6.2)
e(x)
Z
def()Pold(x; ) = Z (x  x) ; (6.7)
so that the joint posterior becomes
Pnew(x; ) =
1
(x; )
Pold(x; )(x  x)ef() : (6.8)
where (x; ) =
R
def()Pold(x; ):
The Lagrange multiplier  is determined by rst substituting the posterior into
(6.1) Z
dxd

1
(x; )
Pold(x; )(x  x)ef()

f() = F ; (6.9)
which can be rewritten as
Z
dx

1
(x; )
Z
def()Pold(x; )f()

(x  x) = F : (6.10)
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Integrating over x yields,
R
def()Pold(x
0; )f()
(x0; )
= F (6.11)
where (x; )!  0(x0; ) = R def()Pold(x0; ). Now  can be determined by
@ ln  0
@
= F : (6.12)
The nal step is to marginalize the posterior, Pnew(x; ) over x to get our updated
probability,
Pnew() = Pold(x
0; )
ef()
(x0; )
(6.13)
Additionally, this result can be rewritten using the product rule as
Pnew() = Pold()Pold(x
0j)e
f()
 0
; (6.14)
where  0(x0; ) =
R
def()Pold()Pold(x
0j): The right side resembles Bayes rule,
where the term Pold(x0j) is the standard Bayesian likelihood and Pold() is the prior.
For  = 0 (no moment constraint) we recover Bayesrule. For  6= 0 Bayesrule is
modied by a canonicalexponential factor.
6.2 Commuting and non-commuting constraints
The ME method allows one to process information in the form of constraints. When
we are confronted with several constraints we must be particularly cautious. In what
order should they be processed? Or should they be processed at the same time? The
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answer depends on the nature of the constraints and the question being asked.
We refer to constraints as commuting when it makes no di¤erence whether they
are handled simultaneously or sequentially. The most common example is that of
Bayesian updating on the basis of data collected in multiple experiments: for the
purpose of inferring  it is well known that the order in which the observed data
x0 = fx01; x02; : : :g is processed does not matter. The proof that ME is completely
compatible with Bayes rule implies that data constraints implemented through 
functions, as in (6.2), commute just as they do in Bayes. It is useful to see how this
comes about.
It is important to note that when an experiment is repeated it is common to refer
to the value of x in the rst experiment and the value of x in the second experiment.
This is a dangerous practice because it obscures the fact that we are actually talking
about two separate variables. We do not deal with a single x but with a composite
x = (x1; x2) and the relevant space is X1  X2  . After the rst experiment
yields the value x01, represented by the constraint c1 : P (x1) = (x1   x01), we can
perform a second experiment that yields x02 and is represented by a second constraint
c2 : P (x2) = (x2   x02). These constraints c1 and c2 commute because they refer to
di¤erent variables x1 and x2.1
In general constraints need not commute and when this is the case the order in
which they are processed is critical. For example, suppose the prior is Pold and we
receive information in the form of a constraint, C1. To update we maximize the
1The use of the  function has been criticized in that by implementing it, the probability is
completely constrained, thus it cannot be updated by future information. This is certainly true!
An experiment, once performed and its outcome observed, cannot be un-performed and its result
cannot be un-observed by subsequent experiments. Thus, imposing constraint c1 does not imply a
revision of c2.
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Figure 6-1: Illustrating the di¤erence between processing two constraints C1 and C2
sequentially (Pold ! P1 ! P (a)new) and simultaneously (Pold ! P (b)new or Pold ! P1 !
P
(b)
new).
entropy S[P; Pold] subject to C1 leading to the posterior P1 as shown in Figure 6-1.
Next we receive a second piece of information described by the constraint C2. At this
point we can proceed in essentially two di¤erent ways:
(a) Sequential updating - Having processed C1, we use P1 as the current
prior and maximize S[P; P1] subject to the new constraint C2. This leads us to the
posterior P (a)new.
(b) Simultaneous updating - Use the original prior Pold and maximize S[P; Pold]
subject to both constraints C1 and C2 simultaneously. This leads to the posterior
P
(b)
new.2
To decide which path (a) or (b) is appropriate, we must be clear about how the
ME method treats constraints. The ME machinery interprets a constraint such as C1
in a very mechanical way: all distributions satisfying C1 are in principle allowed and
2At rst sight it might appear that there exists a third possibility of simultaneous updating: (c)
use P1 as the current prior and maximize S[P; P1] subject to both constraints C1 and C2 simultane-
ously. Fortunately, and this is a valuable check for the consistency of the ME method, it is easy to
show that case (c) is equivalent to case (b). Whether we update from Pold or from P1 the selected
posterior is P (b)new .
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all distributions violating C1 are ruled out.
Updating to a posterior P1 consists precisely in revising those aspects of the prior
Pold that disagree with the new constraint C1. However, there is nothing nal about
the distribution P1. It is just the best we can do in our current state of knowledge and
we fully expect that future information may require us to revise it further. Indeed,
when new information C2 is received we must reconsider whether the original C1
remains valid or not. Are all distributions satisfying the new C2 really allowed, even
those that violate C1? If this is the case then the new C2 takes over and we update
from P1 to P
(a)
new. The constraint C1 may still retain some lingering e¤ect on the
posterior P (a)new through P1; but in general C1 has now become obsolete.
Alternatively, we may decide that the old constraint C1 retains its validity. The
new C2 is not meant to revise C1 but to provide an additional renement of the
family of allowed posteriors. In this case the constraint that correctly reects the new
information is not C2 but the more restrictive space where C1 and C2 overlap. The
two constraints should be processed simultaneously to arrive at the correct posterior
P
(b)
new.
To summarize: sequential updating is appropriate when old constraints become
obsolete and are superseded by new information; simultaneous updating is appro-
priate when old constraints remain valid. The two cases refer to di¤erent states of
information and therefore we expect that they will result in di¤erent inferences. These
comments are meant to underscore the importance of understanding what information
is being processed; failure to do so will lead to errors that do not reect a shortcoming
of the ME method but rather a misapplication of it.
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6.3 Sequential updating: a loaded die example
This example, which considers a loaded die, illustrates the appropriateness of sequen-
tial updating. The background information is the following: A certain factory makes
loaded dice. Unfortunately because of poor quality control, the dice are not identical
and it is not known how each die is loaded. It is known, however, that the dice
produced by this factory are such that face 2 is on the average twice as likely to come
up as face 5.
The mathematical representation of this situation is as follows. The fact that we
deal with dice is modeled in terms of multinomial distributions. The probability that
casting a k-sided die n times yields mi instances for the ith face is
Pold(mj) = Pold(m1:::mkj1:::k; n) = n!
m1!:::mk!
m11 :::
mk
k ; (6.15)
where m = (m1; : : : ;mk) with
Pk
i=1mi = n, and  = (1; : : : ; k) with
Pk
i=1 i = 1.
The generic problem is to infer the parameters  on the basis of information about
moments of  and data m0. The additional information about how the dice are loaded
is represented by the constraint h2i = 2 h5i. Note that this piece of information
refers to the factory as a whole and not to any individual die. The constraint is of
the general form of (6.1)
C1 : hf()i = F where f() =
Pk
i fii : (6.16)
For this particular factory F = 0, and all fi = 0 except for f2 = 1 and f5 =  2. Now
that the background information has been given, here is our rst example.
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We purchase a die. On the basis of our general knowledge of dice we are led to
write down a joint prior
Pold(m; ) = Pold()Pold(mj) : (6.17)
(The particular form of Pold() is not important for our current purpose so for the
sake of deniteness we can choose it at.) At this point the only information we have
is that we have a die and it came from a factory described by C1. Accordingly, we
use ME to update to a new joint distribution. This is shown as P1 in Figure 6-1. The
relevant entropy is
S[P; Pold] =  
P
m
R
d P (x; ) log
P (x; )
Pold(x; )
; (6.18)
where
P
m
=
nP
m1:::mk=0
(
Pk
i=1mi   n) and
R
d =
R
d1 : : : dk (
Pk
i=1 i   1) ;
Maximizing S subject to normalization and C1 gives the P1 posterior
P1(m; ) =
ef()
Z1
Pold(m; ) ; (6.19)
where the normalization constant Z1 and the Lagrange multiplier  are determined
from
Z1 =
R
d ef()Pold() and
@ logZ1
@
= F : (6.20)
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The joint distribution P1(m; ) = P1()P1(mj) can be rewritten as
P1(m; ) = P1()Pold(mj) where P1() = Pold()e
f()
Z1
: (6.21)
To nd out more about this particular die we toss it n times and obtain data
m0 = (m01; : : : ;m
0
k) which we represent as a new constraint
C2 : P (m) = mm0 : (6.22)
Our goal is to infer the  that apply to our particular die. The original constraint C1
applies to the whole factory while the new constraint C2 refers to the actual die of
interest and thus takes precedence over C1: As n ! 1 we expect C1 to become less
and less relevant. Therefore the two constraints should be processed sequentially.
Using ME, that is (5.10), we impose C2 and update from P1(m; ) to a new joint
distribution (shown as P (a)new in Figure 6-1)
P (a)new(m; ) = mm0P1(jm) : (6.23)
Marginalizing over m and using (6.21) the nal posterior for  is
P (a)new() = P1(jm0) = P1()
P1(m
0j)
P1(m0)
=
1
Z2
ef()Pold()Pold(m
0j) : (6.24)
where
Z2 =
R
d ef()Pold()Pold(m
0j) : (6.25)
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The readers will undoubtedly recognize that (6.24) is precisely the result obtained
by using MaxEnt to obtain a prior, in this case P1() given in (6.21), and then using
Bayestheorem to take the data into account. This familiar result has been derived
in some detail for two reasons: rst, to reassure the readers that ME does reproduce
the standard solutions to standard problems and second, to establish a contrast with
the example discussed next.
6.4 Simultaneous updating: a loaded die example
Here is a di¤erent problem illustrating the appropriateness of simultaneous updating.
The background information is the same as in the previous example. The di¤erence
is that the factory now hires a quality control engineer who wants to learn as much
as he can about the factory. His initial knowledge is described by the same prior
Pold(m; ), (6.17). After some inquiries he is told that the only available information
is
C1 : h2i = 2 h5i : (6.26)
Not satised with this limited information he decides to collect data that reect the
production of the whole factory. He proceeds to collect n randomly chosen dice,
tossing each one once, yielding data m0 = (m01; : : : ;m
0
k) which is represented as a
constraint,
C2 : P (m) = mm0 : (6.27)
The apparent resemblance with (6.22) may be misleading: (6.22) refers to a single
die, while (6.27) now refers to n dice. The goal here is to infer the distribution of
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 that describes the overall population of dice produced by the factory. The new
constraint C2 is information in addition to, rather than instead of, the old C1: the
two constraints should be processed simultaneously. From (6.8) the joint posterior is3
P (b)new(m; ) = mm0Pold(jm0)
ef()
Z
: (6.28)
Marginalizing over m the posterior for  is
P (b)new() = Pold(jm0)
ef()
Z
=
1

ef()Pold()Pold(m
0j) ; (6.29)
where the new normalization constant is
 =
R
d ef()Pold()Pold(m
0j) and @ log 
@
= F : (6.30)
This looks similar to the sequential case, (6.24), but there is a crucial di¤erence:
 6=  and  6= Z2, where  is determined by (6.20),  is determined by (6.29). In
the sequential updating case, the multiplier  is chosen so that the intermediate P1
satises C1 while the posterior P
(a)
new only satises C2. In the simultaneous updating
case the multiplier  is chosen so that the posterior P (b)new satises both C1 and C2 or
C1 ^C2. Ultimately, the two distributions Pnew() are di¤erent because they refer to
di¤erent problems: P (a)new() refers to a single die, while P
(b)
new() applies to the set of
n dice obtained from the factory.4
3As mentioned in the previous footnote, whether we update from Pold or from P1 we obtain the
same posterior P (b)new .
4For the sake of completeness, we note that, because of the peculiarities of  functions, had the
constraints been processed sequentially but in the opposite order, rst the data C2, and then the
moment C1, the resulting posterior would be the same as for simultaneous update to P
(b)
new .
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6.5 More on the multinomial problem
In this section, we show that when the data is discrete, we can produce a compact
form for the entropy that is similar to the thermodynamic entropy. We also show
how the posterior of the multinomial problem (6.29) can be calculated.
Compact form of the multinomial entropy
Here we calculate another form for the above entropy. We start with start with the
general posterior,
Pnew(m; ) = Pold(m; )mm0
ef()
(x; )
: (6.31)
where (m;) =
R
def()Pold(m; ): This is substituted into the appropriate entropy
(6.18) which yields,
S =  
X
m
Z
d Pold(m; )mm0
ef()
(m;)
log
Pold(m; )mm0
ef()
(m;)
Pold(m; )
: (6.32)
We cancel the priors in the log,
S =  
X
m
Z
d Pold(m; )mm0
ef()
(m;)
log
mm0e
f()
(m;)
; (6.33)
then sum over the discrete m which yields,
S =  
Z
d Pold(m
0; )
ef()
 0(m0; )
log
ef()
 0(m0; )
: (6.34)
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Notice that (x; ) is a function of x: Thus when the delta function is evaluated,
(m;)! (m0; ): This can be rewritten as
S =  
Z
d Pold(m
0; )
ef()
 0(m0; )
 
log ef()   log  0(m0; ) : (6.35)
Since  and log  0(m0; ) are not functions of , this can then be written as
S =   
 0(m0; )
Z
d Pold(m
0; )ef()f() + log  0(m0; )
Z
d Pold(m
0; )
ef()
 0(m0; )
:
(6.36)
Notice, since (x0; ) =
R
def()Pold(x
0; ); the second term becomes, log  0. Also,
since
R
d Pold(x
0; )ef()f() = @ 0=@ = F 0; the rst term is  F and thus the
entropy can now be written as
S[P; Pold] =  F + log  0(x0; ) : (6.37)
Shannon had discovered the entropy that bears his name quite independently of
thermodynamic considerations. Jaynes extended Shannons logic by using a gener-
alization of his method and derived the canonical ensemble of Gibbs that is used in
thermodynamics. In our method we generalize both Shannon and Jayneslogic (which
has nothing to do with thermodynamics directly) yet our new measure for diversity
turns out to take the same form as the thermodynamic entropy. The realization that
the ME diversity is of the exact same form as the thermodynamic may be useful.
Concepts in thermodynamics such as energy, could be used applied to other elds.5
5The thermodynamic entropy is actually, S = log  +F . The fact that our entropy (6.37) has a
 F is a reection of our choice to add our Lagrange multipliers in (6.3) as opposed to subtracting
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Calculation of the multinomial posterior
Here we pursue the calculation of the posterior (6.29) in more detail. To be specic
we choose a at prior, Pold() = constant. Then, dropping the superscript (b),
Pnew() =
1
e
(
kP
i
i   1)
kQ
i=1
efii
m0i
i : (6.38)
where  is,
 =
Z
(
kP
i
i   1)
kQ
i=1
die
fii
m0i
i ; (6.39)
and  is determined from (6.30) which in terms of  now reads @ log =@ = F . A
brute force calculation gives  as a nested hypergeometric series,
 = efkI1(I2(: : : (Ik 1))) ; (6.40)
where each I is written as a sum,
Ij =  (bj   aj)
1X
qj=0
 (aj + qj)
 (bj + qj) qj!
t
qj
j Ij+1 with Ik = 1 : (6.41)
The index j takes all values from 1 to k   1 and the other symbols are dened as
follows: tj =  (fk j   fk), aj = m0k j + 1, and
bj = n+ j + 1 +
j 1P
i=0
qi  
k j 1P
i=0
m0i ; (6.42)
them as Jaynes did to get the thermodynamic entropy. However, this is trivial because when one
solves for  in (6.12) the sign will be accounted for. In other words, if the Lagrange multiplier was
subtracted, the solution to (6.12) would be  F and the entropy would have a +F .
78
with q0 = m00 = 0. The terms that have indices  0 are equal to zero (i.e. b0 =
q0 = 0; etc.). A few technical details are worth mentioning: First, one can have
singular points when tj = 0. In these cases the sum must be evaluated as the limit
as tj ! 0: Second, since aj and bj are positive integers the gamma functions involve
no singularities. Lastly, the sums converge because aj > bj. The normalization for
the rst die example, (6.25), can be calculated in a similar way. Currently, for small
values of k (less than 10) it is feasible to evaluate the nested sums numerically; for
larger values of k it is best to evaluate the integral for  using sampling methods.
6.6 Summary
The realization that the ME method incorporates Bayesrule as a special case has
allowed us to go beyond Bayesrule to process both data and expected value con-
straints simultaneously. To put it bluntly, anything one can do with Bayes can also be
done with ME with the additional ability to include information that was inaccessible
to Bayes alone. This raises several questions and we have o¤ered a few answers.
First, it is not uncommon to claim that the non-commutability of constraints
represents a problem for the ME method. Processing constraints in di¤erent orders
might lead to di¤erent inferences and this is said to be unacceptable. We have argued
that, on the contrary, the information conveyed by a particular sequence of constraints
is not the same information conveyed by the same constraints in di¤erent order. Since
di¤erent informational states should in general lead to di¤erent inferences, the way
ME handles non-commuting constraints should not be regarded as a shortcoming but
rather as a feature of the method.
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Why is this type of problem beyond the reach of Bayesian methods? After all,
we can always interpret an expected value as a sample average in a su¢ ciently large
number of trials. This is equivalent to constructing a large imaginary ensemble of
experiments. Entropy methods then become in principle superuous; all we need
is probability. The problem with inventing imaginary ensembles to do away with
entropy in favor of mere probabilities, or to do away with probabilities in favor of
more intuitive frequencies, is that the ensembles are just what they are claimed to
be, imaginary. They are purely articial constructions invented for the purpose of
handling incomplete information. It seems to us that a safer way to proceed is to
handle the available information directly as given (i.e., as expected values) without
making additional assumptions about an imagined reality.
Finally we address the title of this chapter: Universal updating. The data, con-
straints, priors and posteriors are of a general form in the rst section. However, the
process that was used to produce our result is universal. It consistently encompasses
all methods of inference.
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Chapter 7
Potential applications using ME
7.1 Applying ME in ecology
The core of this chapter has been previously published in [46].
Diversity is a concept that is used in many elds to describe the variability of
di¤erent entities in a group. In ecology, the Shannon index [47] and Simpsons index
[48] are the predominant measures of diversity. The purpose of measuring diversity
is to judge the relationship between other communities or to communities and their
environmental conditions. In this paper we focus on the Shannon index since it is
closely tied to many other areas of research, such as information theory and physics.
It is often the case that the individuals comprising a community cannot be fully
counted. In this case, when one has incomplete information, one must rely on methods
of inference. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the ME method can
be used in the measure of diversity. By using ME, we have the ability to include more
information than the traditional use of Shannons measure allows.
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Traditionally when confronted with a community whose individuals cannot be
fully counted, the frequencies of the species that are counted are used to calculate the
diversity. The frequency is used because it represents an estimate of the probability
of nding a particular species in the community. However, the frequency is not
equivalent to the probability (shown in chapter 1) and may be a poor estimate.
Fortunately, there are much better methods for estimating or inferring the probability
such as MaxEnt and Bayes. Even more fortunate is that the new ME method can
reproduce every aspect of Bayesian and MaxEnt inference and tackle problems that
the two methods alone could not address.
We examine one of the sets of axioms describing the desirable attributes of a di-
versity measure [47]. The attributes will single out the Shannon entropy as the proper
measure. We then solve a toy ecological problem and discuss the diversity calculated
by using the traditional approach and the diversity calculated by incorporating the
ME method. This illustrates the many advantages to using the ME method with out
losing the desirable properties of the traditional diversity measure.
Traditional Diversity
In 1969, Evelyn Christine Pielou described the properties that a measure of diversity,
H should possess [47]:
Pielous Axioms
1. For a given number of species, s; H should have its greatest value when pi = 1=s
for all i: Such a community will be called completely even.
2. Given two completely even communities, one with s species and the other with
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s+ 1; the latter should have the greater value of H:
3. If individuals in a community are classiable in more than one way, then one
should be able to separate out the classications from the joint classication.
For the 3rd axiom, we quote Pielou, Suppose the community members are subject
to two separate classications (not necessarily independent), namely anA-classication
with a classes and a B-classication with b classes. Let pi(i = 1; : : : ; a) be the pro-
portion of community members in the ith class of the A-classication; let qij(i =
1; : : : ; a; j = 1; : : : ; b) be the proportion of these members that belong to the jth class
of the B-classication. And put piqij = ij so that ij is the proportion of the whole
community that belongs to the ith A-class and jth B-class.
Also, put H(AB) for the diversity of the doubly classied community; H(A) for
the diversity under the A-classication only; and H(B) for the diversity under the
B-classication of that part of the community belonging to the ith A-class.
Let HA(B) =
P
piHi(B) be the mean of the Hi(B) over all A-classes.
We then require that H(AB) = H(A) +HA(B):
Pielou showed that the only measure that satised these axioms was
H =  C
kX
i
pi log p ; (7.1)
where C is a positive constant, pi = mi=n; mi represents the counts of each species
and n represents the total of all species so that n =
Pk
i mi: This was called the
Shannon index or Shannon diversity because Claude Shannon used a similar set of
axioms to attain the identical function (as shown in Chapter 3).
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Toy Example
The general information for our example is as follows: There are k known types of
plants in a forest. A portion of the forest is examined and the number of each species
is counted where m1;m2 : : :mk represents the counts of each species and n represents
the total count so that n =
Pk
i mi: Additionally, we know from biological examination
that one species, s2 and another species, s5 are codependent. Perhaps they each need
something from the other in order to function. For simplicity, let this dependence be
such that on the average, twice the number of s2 will be found compared to s5:
The problem with a method using the function (7.1) as a measure of diversity is not
in the method itself but with the reason it is being used. If the purpose of using this
method is to measure the diversity of the portion of the community that was counted
or to measure the diversity of a community that is fully censused (fully counted),
then the method is acceptable. However, if the purpose of the method is to estimate
or infer the diversity of a community that cannot be fully counted (i.e. the whole
forest), then it may be a poor estimate. First, pi is meant to represent the probability
of nding the ith species in the forest. As shown in chapter 1, the frequency of the
sample,  is not equivalent to the probability, p. In fact, it is the expected value of
the frequency that is equivalent to the probability, hi = p. It would only make sense
to use the frequency as an estimate of the probability when the number of samples
or counts, n is very large (i.e. n!1) but this is not usually the case. Second, there
is no clear way to process the information about the codependence using Shannons
entropy. We would wish to include more information than just the frequency, such as
other constraints like codependence.
84
Applying ME to diversity
Here we intend to use a better method to estimate or infer pi and that method is the
ME method. Since this probability is unknown, we will use i as a parameter that
represents the probability. The rst task is to realize that the correct mathematical
model for the probability of getting a particular species where the information that
we have is the number of species counted. The proper model is the multinomial
distribution. For our example, the probability of nding mi instances of the ith
species, where the total number of species, k and the total number of counts, n are
known is
Pold(mj; n) = n!
m1! : : :mk!
m11 : : : 
mk
k ; (7.2)
where m = (m1; : : : ;mk) with
Pk
i=1mi = n, and  = (1; : : : ; k) with
Pk
i=1 i = 1.
The general problem is to infer the parameters  on the basis of information about
the data, m and other possible constraints, such as codependency. Here we see the
rst advantage with using the ME diversity; we allow for uctuations in our inference
by looking at a distribution of s as opposed to claiming that we know the true:
Additionally we can include information about the codependence by using the
following general constraint,
hf()i = F where f() =
Xk
i
fii ; (7.3)
where fi is used to represent the codependence. For our example, on the average, we
will nd twice the number of s2 as compared to s5 thus, on the average, the probability
of nding one of the species will be twice that of the other, h2i = 2 h5i. In this case,
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f2 = 1; f5 =  2 and fi6=(2;5) = F = 0:
Next we need to write the observed data (counts) as a constraint which in general
is
P (mjn) = mm0 ; (7.4)
where m0 = fm01; : : : ;m0kg: Finally we write the appropriate entropy,
S[P; Pold] = 
X
m
Z
dP (m; jn) log P (m; jn)
Pold(m; jn) ; (7.5)
where X
m
=
nX
m1:::mk=0
(
Xk
i=1
mi   n) ; (7.6)
and Z
d =
Z
d1 : : : dk 
Xk
i=1
i   1

; (7.7)
and where Pold(m; jn) = Pold(jn)Pold(mj; n):We then maximize this entropy with
respect to P (m; jn) subject to normalization and our constraints which after mar-
ginalizing over m0 yields,
P (jn) = Pold(jn)Pold(m0j; n)e
f()

; (7.8)
where
 =
Z
d ef()Pold(jn)Pold(m0j; n) and F = @ log 
@
: (7.9)
The probability distribution P (jn) has sometimes been criticized for being too
strange. The idea of getting a probability of a probabilitymay seem strange at rst
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but makes absolute sense. We do not know the true distribution of species, i:
Therefore it seems natural to express our knowledge with some uncertainty in the
form of a distribution. Notice that if one has no information relating the species then
 = 0:
Now that we have a distribution of possible probabilities for each species, which
one should we choose? Often the mean of the distribution is used chosen as a rep-
resentative estimate. We then use this estimate in the diversity measure so that we
have,
HME =  
kX
i
hii log hii ; (7.10)
where C = 1 and hii =
R
d i P (jn) is the mean of (7.8). Another possible solution
would be the mean of the diversity measure itself
hHi =
Z
dP (jn)
 
 
kX
i
i log i
!
: (7.11)
Summary
Diversity is an important concept in many elds, such as ecology. In this paper we
provided a toy example of how ME would be used to produce a better estimate that
could be used in a measure of diversity, as opposed to using a frequency. By using
the multinomial, we not only properly infer  so that uctuations are represented, we
get the bonus of being able to include additional constraint information.
7.2 Complex Agents
The core of this chapter has been previously published in [49].
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There are many examples of systems where agents respond to both local infor-
mation as well as global information. Nature yields many such examples where cells
react to local stimuli yet carry some global instructions, such as reproduction. The
examples get more complex when the cells interact locally or share information. We
would like to infer something about the system or better, what each agent infers
about the system. It is this latter case that we will be specically addressing. The
main purpose of this section is to examine a situation where each agent in a network
(of varying degrees of complexity) infers something about the whole system based on
limited information.
We solve a toy problem where we include global information in the form of a
moment constraint or expected value and then introduce local information in the
form of data. This will show how the agents infer aspects of the whole system using
the same process yet come to di¤erent conclusions. Complexity is increased as the
number of agents are increased yet the complexity of the process does not grow
proportionately. This illustrates the advantages to using the ME method.
The agent example
Let us start with a very simple example: There is a class with 3 students sitting in
desks next to each other and one professor. The professor announces that he has a
machine that produces loaded, 3 sided dice and he would like his students to try to
infer the probability of each getting a 1, a 2 or a 3 in a single toss. He tells them
that he has created this machine in such a way that on the average, a side 1 is twice
as likely to come up as a side 3. Now he rolls the a die without showing them the
results. He announces that he has rolled n of these dice, each once. Then he writes
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down how many times a 1 came up on a piece of paper and hands it to student A,
careful not to let the other students see it. He proceeds to do this for each of the
other students, giving student B the results of side 2 and student C the results of side
3: What would each student determine the probabilities of the sides of the next die
to be created be? Each needs to determine the probability of getting any particular
outcome of a die that is produced in one toss (i) given the information.
We summarize the information the following way: there are 3 agents, A, B and
C. Randomly chosen dice are rolled once with the counts of each side that is rolled
represented by, m1;m2 and m3 respectively with n representing the total number
of rolls (as well as dice since each dice is only tossed once) so that n =
P3
i=1mi:
Additionally, we know that on the average one a side, 1 is twice as likely to be rolled
as 3; or better, h1i = 2 h3i
The rst task is to realize that the correct mathematical model for the probability
of getting a particular side where the information that we have is the number of sides
counted is a multinomial distribution. The probability of nding k sides in n counts
which yields mi instances for the ith side is
Pold(mj; n) = n!
m1! : : :mk!
m11 : : : 
mk
k ; (7.12)
where m = (m1; : : : ;mk) with
Pk
i=1mi = n, and  = (1; : : : ; k) with
Pk
i=1 i = 1.
The general problem is to infer the parameters  on the basis of information about
the data, m:
Additionally we can include information about the bias of the sides by using the
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following general constraint,
hf()i = F where f() =
Xk
i
fii ; (7.13)
where fi is used to represent the machine bias. For our example, on the average, we
will nd twice the number of 1 as compared to 3 thus, on the average, the probability
of nding one of the sides will be twice that of the other, h1i = 2 h3i. In this case,
f1 = 1; f3 =  2 and f2 = F = 0:
Next we need to write the observed data (counts) as a constraint which for student
A is
P (m1jn) = m1m01 ; (7.14)
where m01 is the number of counts for side 1: The appropriate form of the entropy is
S[P; Pold] = 
X
m
Z
dP (m; jn) log P (m; jn)
Pold(m; jn) ; (7.15)
where X
m
=
nX
m1:::m3=0
(
X3
i=1
mi   n) ; (7.16)
and Z
d =
Z
d1d2
X3
i=1
i   1

; (7.17)
and where Pold(m; jn) = Pold(jn)Pold(mj; n): The prior Pold() is not important for
our current purpose so for the sake of deniteness we can choose it at for our example
(there are most likely better choices for priors). We then maximize this entropy (7.15)
with respect to P (m; jn) subject to normalization and our constraints to get our joint
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posterior,
PA(;m) =
m1m01
A
n!
m1!m2!(nm1m2)!
m11 
m2
2 (112)
n m1 m2e(31+22 2) (7.18)
where A is a normalization constant. After marginalizing over m we get,
PA(1; 2) =
1
 0A
e(31+22 2)m
0
1
1 (1  1)n m
0
1 ; (7.19)
where
 0A =
Z
d1d2 e
(31+22 2)m
0
1
1 (1  1)n m
0
1 ; (7.20)
and  is determined from
F =
@ log 
@
:
Notice that if one has no information relating the sides then  = 0:
This is the probability distribution that student A would assign to the die. Since
all of the students will follow the same proper inference method (ME), we need only
look at one of the students solutions in general. The only di¤erence between each
studentssolution will be the value of m0. Notice that all students or agents agree on
some global information, the bias of the die machine and the number of dice rolled.
However, in general they will determine a di¤erent probability distribution that is
dependent on the local information, m0, in this case the total number of a particular
side.
Let us now complicate the problem further. Imagine that each students desk is
at a vertex of an equilateral triangle (so that they are equidistant from each other).
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Figure 7-1: An example structure that relates agents in a system. Here each vertex
is an agent.
They notice that the teacher is looking the other way so they each glance at their
neighbors paper. Since each of them now have all of the information they should
all come up with the same answers. However, let us increase increasing the number
of students. We enlarge the class by adding k students with a professor rolling a k
sided dice that are loaded in some given way. The students are arranged in a lattice
structure such as in Figure 7-1. where there is one student at each of the vertices.
Each student that is not on an boundary now has six neighbors. Thus if they are
allowed to lookat their nearest neighbors, the form of the probability distribution
that each student would now assign is
PS(1:::k 1) =
1
S
e
fk
 
1 
k 1P
i
i
!
(1 
7X
i
i)
n 
7P
i
m
0
i
7Y
i=1

m0i
i
k 1Y
i=1
efii : (7.21)
given the constraints (7.13) and P (m1jn) = m1m01 ,. . . , P (m7jn) = m7m07 :
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Summary
We demonstrated that the ME method can easily lend itself to agent-based modeling.
Whether the agents are skin cells, banks in a network or students in a classroom, the
methodology of ME can be applied in order to model many of these systems. Any
system where agents agree on some global information yet react to local information
should be able to be modeled with this method. The observed local data is applied as
a constraint such as (7.13) within a model such as (7.12) and the global information
is applied in a constraint such as (7.14). This particular toy problem is complex in
the sense that there can be a very large number of agents. By determining what each
agent seeswe can predict many properties of the system. A future application in
this regard would be to apply decision theory concepts to this approach.
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Chapter 8
Final remarks and future
applications
In part 1, we detailed how we arrived at our present understanding of probabilities
and how we manipulate them  the product and addition rules by Cox. We also
discussed the modern view of entropy and how it relates to known entropies such as
the thermodynamic entropy and the information entropy. We noted that entropy,
including that of Gibbs, is not dependent on an equilibrium situation. This led to
the method of maximum entropy, MaxEnt. It was pointed out throughout that the
results of the methods depended on two key points: First, the methods are a result
of consistency. Second, the methods reect the information that is put into them.
In chapter 4, we showed that Skillings method of induction led us to a unique
general theory of inductive inference, the ME method. The whole approach is ex-
tremely conservative. First, the axioms merely instruct us what not to update do
not change your mind except when forced by new information. Finally, we went be-
yond the insights of Karlbelkar and U¢ nk, and showed that our consistency axiom
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selects a unique, universal value for the parameter  and this value ( = 0) cor-
responds to the usual logarithmic entropy. The advantage of our approach is that
it shows precisely how it is that -entropies with  6= 0 are ruled out as tools for
updating, such as those of Renyi or Tsallis.
In chapter 5, we explored the compatibility of Bayes and ME updating. After
pointing out the distinction between Bayestheorem and the Bayesupdating rule,
we showed that Bayesrule is a special case of ME updating by translating information
in the form of data into constraints that can be processed using ME. This implies
that ME is capable of reproducing every aspect of orthodox Bayesian inference and
proves the complete compatibility of Bayesian and entropy methods. We illustrated
this by showing that ME can be used to derive two results traditionally in the domain
of Bayesian statistics, Laplaces Succession rule and Je¤reys conditioning rule.
In chapter 6, we brought the other chapters together to show that ME is the
universal method for inference. The realization that the ME method incorporates
Bayesrule as a special case has allowed us to go beyond Bayesrule and to process
both data and expected value constraints simultaneously. To put it bluntly, anything
one can do with Bayes can also be done with ME with the additional ability to include
information that was inaccessible to Bayes alone. The generic canonical form of
the posterior distribution for the problem of simultaneous updating with data and
moments was obtained.
We discussed the general problem of non-commuting constraints, when they should
be processed sequentially and when simultaneously. First, it is not uncommon to
hear the claim that the non-commutability of constraints represents a problem for
the ME method. Processing constraints in di¤erent orders might lead to di¤erent
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inferences and this is said to be unacceptable. We have argued that, on the contrary,
the information conveyed by a particular sequence of constraints is not the same
information conveyed by the same constraints in di¤erent order. Since di¤erent in-
formational states should in general lead to di¤erent inferences, the way ME handles
non-commuting constraints should not be regarded as a shortcoming but rather as
a feature of the method. To illustrate this, a multinomial example of die tosses is
solved in detail for two supercially similar but actually very di¤erent problems.
In chapter 7, we attempt to show that ME is truly universal by applying it to
other problems outside of physics, from which it originates. The applications reect
problems of potential interest. In ecology, we reexamine how diversity is measured
and improve upon the current method by allowing for uctuations and not relying
on asymptotic arguments. In the agent application, we discuss how the ME method
can be used to model complex systems that have local information as well as global
information.
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